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INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays public investors have an extensive set of instruments to assess the quality of the 
investment. Future prospects could be evaluated by analyzing stock performance related 
characteristics or through the thorough analysis of the balance sheet or corporate events. 
Prevailingly, official information properly reflects company’s actual state, yet in some cases 
investors might be unaware of events connected with the corporate governance. There are firms, 
where controlling shareholders or managers use their position to enjoy exclusive benefits unavailable 
to minority shareholders. Impossibility to directly identify the presence and measure the size of those 
benefits disturbs investors. Especially minority shareholders could be intrigued with the relationship 
between these benefits and value of their stakes.  
 What are the rationales behind those concerns? Formally the owners of a company authorize 
agents to manage their resources in a way that will maximize their welfare. Perfect competition 
conditions imply that welfare of shareholders is maximized through increasing firm value. However, 
virtual circumstances deteriorate such model by including personal interests of individuals having 
the authority to use resources in favor of their personal welfare. Thus, management may undertake 
actions or projects that potentially reduce value through the excessive consumption of perquisites, 
unneeded acquisitions or shirking. These actions are usually initiated in companies with diffused 
ownership, where the management is not strictly controlled by the shareholders. In companies with 
the controlling shareholders, on the other side, expropriation of minority shareholders by block 
holders may take place, also causing potential value decrease. In academic literature, possibility to 
have opportunities of undertaking these actions is named as “private benefits of control”. Formal 
description of PBC is depicted as follows: “Some value, whatever the source, is not shared among all 
shareholders in proportion of the shares owned, but it is enjoyed exclusively by the party in control” 
(Dyck, Zingales, 2004).  
Usually minority shareholders who do not hold any managing positions at a company do not 
have any influence on the magnitude of private benefits of control. But what is more important it is 
impossible for them to recognize the presence of those benefits. As (Muravyev, 2007) claims: “If 
these private benefits could be evaluated they would immediately lose their “privacy” and minority 
shareholders could bring in a lawsuit against the corporation or the controlling owner”. Hence, any 
individual or even institutional investor unable to purchase a block of shares could potentially 
become an owner of a company, where investors’ property might be employed for management’s 
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personal welfare increment.  Despite the presence of private benefits of control, they could not be 
evidenced directly and their potential magnitude could be estimated only indirectly.  
We therefore need to justify whether those expectations may have a real implication on a 
firm value. Thus, the research goal of the master thesis is to determine the relationship between 
private benefits of control and firm value. 
The research goal will be analyzed by means of the set of research objectives stated below: 
• To determine firm valuation approaches which are the most adequately relate to the 
goal and to define a set of factors related to firm value other than private benefits of 
control; 
• To explore approaches to measure private benefits of control and choose one that is 
mostly consistent with the stated research goal; 
• To conduct an empirical study to determine the relationship between private benefits 
of control and firm value; 
• To analyze the results of the empirical study and draw final conclusion. 
The object of this thesis are Russian and German public companies. The primary subject of 
the research is the relationship between private benefits of control and firm value.  
The paper is an empirical research conducted by the employment of econometric analysis, 
made by using econometric tools in the Stata software.  
Information was mainly gathered from several sources: theoretical articles devoted to the 
problem of firm value determinants; contemporary academic articles researching emerging and 
developed markets, where the problem of private benefits of control is discussed; analytical reports 
(e.g. PricewaterhouseCoopers); professional periodic literature (Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Journal of Economics, Journal of Finance, The Financial Times and many others); 
reputable textbooks where problems of firm valuation and private benefits of control are described.  
Data for the purpose of the regression analysis is assembled through the number of databases 
and official documents. Among databases were Thompson Reuters Eikon, Thompson Reuters 
DataStream, SKRIN and SPARK. In addition to databases, data is obtained from the official annual 
and quarterly reports of companies.  
The master thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter is completely devoted to the 
problem of different valuation approaches. In this chapter, theoretical background of a variety 
approaches to firm valuation is discussed. Further, a number of researches where these approaches 
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are applied is presented. Eventually, in the first chapter the final choice of the firm value proxy is 
made.  
The second chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, problem of private benefits of 
control is outlined and different approaches to measure PBC are discussed. In the second part, latest 
empirical papers, which explore the problem of private benefits of control are reviewed. 
Finally, in the third part, empirical research is done. It is conducted through the consistent 
execution of several steps: choice of methodology, sample selection, in-depth analysis of descriptive 
statistics, econometric analysis and reporting of final results of the study. Based on the obtained 
results, managerial implication and contribution to the subject is discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1. FIRM VALUATION. REVIEW OF APPROACHES. 
The following chapter is fully devoted to the discussion of different valuation approaches. 
This chapter results in the final choice of firm value proxying approach and the inclusion of 
variables which have to be controlled in accordance with the chosen proxy. The chapter is structured 
as follows. First, theoretical background of the firm valuation topic is described. Second, the most 
recent papers differently proxying firm value are presented. And finally, conclusion based on the 
findings is made. 
There are two general approaches used to value a firm. First relates to so-called multiples 
which are calculated by rationing market to accounting indicators. Second concerns of “intrinsic 
value” of a firm and calculated based on a firm’s future cash flows (Pinto, Robinson, Henry, Stowe, 
2010). Both approaches are described and discussed below.  
1.1 Multiples approach  
Valuation approaches based on market indexes use the price and enterprise multiples. First 
group includes coefficients that express the ratio of stock price to one of the operating or accounting 
metrics. The second refers to the coefficients based on the market value of the whole company. 
When price multiples are used, investor estimates the fair share price based on number of units of the 
selected metric she will receive by buying one share, while when enterprise multiples are used 
investor counts for operational income per dollar of ownership. For each of the approaches major 
advantages and disadvantages are provided. The table presented in appendix 1 summarizes all the 
multiples that are further described below. 
1.1.1 Price Multiples 
Price to earnings multiple is calculated by dividing market price per share by earnings per 
share.  
 𝑃/𝐸𝑡 =  
𝑀𝑉𝑡
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡
 (1.1) 
This multiple was first introduced by (Graham, Dodd, 1934) as an approach to seek for 
undervalued companies. Advantageous facet of P/E multiple is the use of the most important from 
investor’s point view characteristics of the company. However, valuation of unprofitable companies 
is impossible by using P/E multiple. 
Another multiple that is used to value a company by using cash flows is price to sales 
multiple, which is represented by the ratio of market value of equity to sales. 
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 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 =  
𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
 (1.2) 
Among pros of this multiple (Damodaran, 2007) emphasizes the ability to value intangible 
assets. Meanwhile, (Pearl, Rosenbaum, 2013) highlight that P/S multiple should be used cautiously 
due to two facts. First, sales do not provide information about actual marginality of the business. 
Second, sales may differ dramatically among industries.  
Price to book value ratio is expressed by division of market price per share by book value of 
equity per share. 
 𝑃/𝐵𝑡 =  
𝑀𝑉𝑡
𝐵𝑉𝑡
 (1.3) 
Application of P/B provides a researcher with the fair valuation, as soon as neither market 
nor book value could be manipulated. P/B multiple doesn’t serve an opportunity for valuing 
companies with a large stake of intangible assets. Moreover, debt of the company is not considered 
while using P/B.  
Market to book multiple represented by the ratio of sum of market value of equity and debt to 
book value of equity and debt.  
 𝑀 − 𝑡 − 𝐵𝑡 =  
𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡 + 𝑀𝑉𝐷𝑡
𝐵𝑉𝐸𝑡 + 𝐵𝑉𝐷𝑡
 (1.4) 
M-t-b is an extended version of P/B ratio, which additionally allows to consider debt in firm 
valuation. Additionally, M-t-b could be calculated for the companies with negative book value of the 
equity, since it is offset by the debt value (Damodaran, 2007). 
Tobin’s Q – is the ratio between market value of a physical assets and their replacement 
costs. 
 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑡 =  
𝑀𝑉𝐸 + 𝐵𝑉𝐷𝑡
𝐵𝑉𝐴𝑡
 (1.5) 
Innovation or breakthroughs in technological development can lead to an increase or 
decrease in the value of the company’s assets. A company could be considered creating an economic 
value for its investors if its surplus income exceeds the difference between the market value of assets 
and the cost of replacing them. If the value of Tobin’s Q is equal to 1, company is priced by the 
market at par. Value less than 1 signals that investors do not expect a company to produce the 
economic value. Tobin’s Q ratio of more than one indicates about good expectations of investors 
regarding company’s ability to produce value with given assets. This ratio is therefore widely used 
12 
 
as a performance measure or relative firm value indicator. However, replacement cost of all assets 
barely could be calculated and replacement costs. Tobin’s Q is therefore proxied by the similar ratio 
with the book value of assets instead of replacement costs.  
P/CF ratio is calculated as the division of market value of equity by cash flow of a company. 
In this equation cash flow is represented by the sum of net income and amortization. 
 𝑃/𝐶𝐹𝑡 =  
𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡
𝐶𝐹𝑡
 (1.6) 
(Pinto, Robinson, Henry, Stowe, 2010) assert that by using cash flow investor or researcher 
may avoid possible inconsistency while comparing different companies. First, P/CF is more stable 
than income based multiples, due to invulnerability to the short-term industry-specific shocks. 
Second, unlike P/E this multiple hardly could be manipulated. 
Another approach to the valuation of company is the use of price to dividends multiple.  
 𝑃/𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 =  
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡
𝐷𝑖𝑣 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡
 (1.7) 
Despite the fact that this ratio rarely used in frim valuation, it has a number of advantages. 
For example, (Weinstein, 1988) argues that unlike profit and revenue, dividends are not subject to 
the large-scale manipulations, they are either paid or not. In addition, the author notes that the 
amount of dividends does not depend on short-term shocks, which can cause a “write-off” of 
company profits. 
1.1.2 Enterprise Multiples 
Enterprise multipliers are designed to measure how many units of operational income 
investor might gain per dollar of ownership in a company. The reason that the use of enterprise 
multiples may be preferable to price multipliers is that the former are less sensitive to the effect of 
financial leverage. One of the problems associated with deploying price ratios is an incorrect 
estimation of companies with a high ratio of borrowed capital. As a result, companies with the 
largest amount of debt could be rated higher than a company with a “healthy” capital structure. With 
employment of enterprise multiples, this problem is avoided. In general, there are three enterprise 
multiples: EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT, EV/Sales.  
Most widely used enterprise multiple is EV/EBITDA. The use of this multiple is 
advantageous when capital expenditures and amortization could be neglected. In researches with 
heterogenous samples, EV/EBITDA helps to minimize influence of factors specific for each industry 
(Copeland, 1983). Another positive effect from deploying this multiple is the possibility to compare 
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companies with negative net income. However, use of EBITDA in numerator may lead to 
overpricing of cash flows (Pinto, Robinson, Henry, Stowe, 2010).  
Another often applied in valuation multiple is EV/EBIT, which is useful when the relative 
amount of capital expenditures is of concern for a researcher. Moreover, it provides more precise 
results while analyzing a sample of homogeneous companies.  
EV/Sales is the least popular enterprise multiple and could be used for the valuation and 
comparison of companies with almost similar industries or where differences in capital expenditures, 
amortization or taxing specifics are neglectable.  
1.2 Fundamental valuation models  
The fundamental value of a company could be expressed as the projected cash flows of this 
company discounted at the specified discount factor. Unlike the valuation based on market multiples, 
models based on fundamental value are necessary to determine the “intrinsic value” of a business 
that may differ significantly from the market valuation. Generally, basic equation considers firm 
value as the sum of fundamental value of equity and fundamental value of debt. 
 𝑉𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 =  𝑉𝐸 + 𝑉𝐷 (1.8) 
where 𝑉𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 – fundamental value of firm, often defined as the value of assets or value of business 
 𝑉𝐸  – fundamental value of equity 
 𝑉𝐷  – fundamental value of debt 
Basically, there are two approaches to value equity of a firm: operating and capital. Former 
implies that the future discounted cash flows associated with firm’s assets are calculated and then 
value of debt is subtracted. Second approach suggests that cash flows to equity should be calculated 
from the outset.  
Besides the equity valuation, the way how cash flows are treated should be determined as the 
next step. Basically, there are two approaches to treat cash flows: firm cash flows and residual 
income flows. 
Thus, fundamental value could be determined in four ways, as presented in Table 1.1. 
 
 
 
14 
 
Table 1.1. Fundamental valuation models taxonomy (Volkov, 2008) 
  
Approaches to equity valuation 
  
Operational Capital 
V
a
lu
e 
cr
ea
ti
n
g
 c
a
sh
 f
lo
w
s 
C
a
sh
 F
lo
w
s Discounted Cash Flows Models 
Discounted Free Cash Flows Model 
(DCFM) 
Dividend Discount Model 
(DDM) 
R
es
id
u
a
l 
In
co
m
e
 Residual Income Models 
Residual Operating Income Model 
(ROIM) 
Residual Earnings Model 
(REM) 
 
1.2.1 Discounted Free Cash Flows Model 
DFCM was first introduced by (Williams, 1938). Further it was popularized among 
professionals and currently described in the number of fundamental papers (Benninga, Sarig, 1997), 
(Damodaran, 2007), (Brealey, Myers, 2011). The main rationale of this model is that the value of 
firm equals its discounted future cash flows. DFCM could be calculated as follows: 
 𝑉𝐸
𝐹𝐶𝐹 =  ∑
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡
(1 + 𝑘𝑤)𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
− 𝐷𝐵𝑉  (1.9) 
where 𝑉𝐸
𝐹𝐶𝐹- fundamental value of equity 
 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑗 – free cash flows at date t 
 𝑘𝑤 – weighted average cost of capital 
 𝐷𝐵𝑉 – book value of debt 
  
DDM is one of the oldest valuation models. The model has many proponents since it is the 
most intuitively understandable one. Dividends, is literally, the only cash flow directly received by 
investors. Firm value could be calculated by using DDM. 
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 𝑉𝐸
𝐷𝐷𝑀 =  ∑
𝑑𝑡
(1 + 𝑘𝑒)𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
− 𝐷𝐵𝑉 (1.10) 
where 𝑉𝐸
𝐷𝐷𝑀- fundamental value of equity 
 𝑑𝑗 – discount factor 
 𝑘𝑒 – required return on equity 
Advantage of DCFM that should be outlined is its ability to precisely value companies on 
stable markets. (Foerster, Sapp, 2005) analyzes 120 year history of Canadian company Bank of 
Montreal and concluded that DCFM provides the closest estimation of value in comparison with 
other fundamental valuation models. Same result is obtained by (Salih, Ok, Akdeniz, 2006), who 
reports that DCFM shows the best valuation estimates of Turkey companies in terms of discrepancy 
from the actual share price. Among disadvantages, (Damodaran, 2007) notes that DCFM models 
lead to undervaluation and utterly conservative results, due to necessity to use low growth rates.   
1.2.2 Residual Income Models 
Residual income models are closely related to the ideas of Economic Value Added. In RIM 
fundamental value of equity depends on four factors: a) invested capital amount b) actual return on 
equity c) required return on equity d) sustainability in ability to add value.  
First residual income model - ReOIM implies that fundamental value of equity comprised of 
two elements: book value of net assets and incremental fundamental value. 
 𝑉𝐸
𝑅𝑒𝑂𝐼𝑀 = 𝑁𝐴0 + ∑
𝑅𝑒𝑂𝐼𝑡
(1 + 𝑘𝑤)𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
− 𝐷0 (1.11) 
where 𝑉𝐸
𝑅𝑒𝑂𝐼𝑀- fundamental value of equity 
 𝑁𝐴0 – net assets at the moment of valuation 
 𝑅𝑒𝑂𝐼𝑡 - residual operating income 
 𝑘𝑤 – weighted average cost of capital 
 𝐷0 – book value of debt at the moment of valuation 
Calculation of REM – second residual income model involves the same procedure, but 
employs residual earnings instead of the residual operating income. 
Major advantage of residual income models is the fact that the necessary input data is limited 
to the accounting statements. Unlike previously described models, the results of RIM do not rely on 
assumptions, since the basis of these models is the company’s official data presented in the reports. 
In addition, number of authors (Pinto, Henry, Robinson, 2007) attribute to the advantages of this 
16 
 
model the possibility of using it in conditions when companies do not pay dividends or have 
negative cash flows.  
(Penman, Penman, 2007) note that REM provides more accurate results than DCFM and 
valuation based on multiples. Comparing the forecasted prices of securities on the exchanges of 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, the authors conclude that REM are the best for valuation on short 
term horizons (less than 6 months). (Francis, Olsson, Oswald, 2000) measure the accuracy of the 
company’s intrinsic value, based on a sample of English companies. Analysis revealed that the error 
in forecasting is 20% less for RIM than for DCFM. The authors hypothesize that rationale behind 
that is the necessity to make large number of assumptions in DCFM. At the same time, it has one 
primary shortcoming. Since the model is based on accounting data, it’s quality significantly relies on 
the quality and completeness of information presented in official reports.  
Overall, fundamental valuation models provide better proxies for firm value than market 
multiples forasmuch as it is based on the intrinsic value of a company with inclusion of firm-specific 
factors influencing the valuation. Valuation based on multiples, however, lowers the probability that 
the result will be skewed due to the inaccuracy of stated assumptions. Overall, chosen approach 
should be consistent with the research goal and objectives.  
1.3 Different approaches in literature 
Given the aforementioned theoretical background, further practical use of those approaches is 
provided below. All the major researchers, studying the determinants of firm value are analyzed and 
presented in the following section, divided in accordance with the approach used in the researches. 
First, papers, where Tobin’s Q used as a proxy of firm value are reviewed. Second, researches where 
market-to-book value is chosen to represent firm value are discussed.  
1.3.1 Tobin’s Q ratio 
 (Gleason, Klock, 2006) investigate whether different measures of intangible capital such as 
advertising and R&D expenses may explain changes in Tobin’s Q ratio for chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries of the U.S. market from 1982 to 2001. Based on the sample of 7 024 
observations, the authors find that advertising and R&D expenses are significantly determine the 
Tobin’s Q ratio and explain more than 20% of this variation.  
In their research (Aggarwal, Kyaw, Zhao, 2006) study the relationship between leverage and 
firm value. Despite the bulk of papers discussing the leverage that had been already found out the 
significant relationship between leverage and firm value, the authors attempt to extend this analysis 
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by introducing new control variables. While controlling for industry leverage effects and other 
concerned independent variables, they document that there is a lack of clarity regarding the 
relationship between leverage and firm value, proxied with Tobin’s Q ratio.  
Tobins’ Q was used as a performance measure by (Adams, Mehran, 2003) who investigate 
the relationship between the board size and the performance of a company. The authors find that 
board independence has no influence on performance, whilst the board size has.  
(Konijn, Kraussl, Lucas, 2011) investigate the effect of the presence of a multiple 
shareholder and shareholders’ dispersion degree on a firm value. By proxying firm value with 
Tobin’s Q ratio, the authors obtain negative correlation between blockholder dispersion and firm 
value, as well as for the multiple blockholders on the U.S. market. They suggest that there might be a 
room for private benefits of control extracted by blockholders at the expense of minority 
shareholders. 
(Xiao, 2009) examines the relationship between agency costs and firm value based on a 
sample of 156 Chinese publicly listed companies which have individual ultimate owners in a period 
between 2002 and 2007. The author finds that the difference between control and cash flow rights 
properly reflect agency costs, and negatively affect firm value, proxied by Tobin’s Q. The author 
also attempts to explore what accounts for the relationship. According to this research, the growth of 
agency costs leads to the stock return decrease around the announcement of the connected party 
transaction. For some transactions, however, this effect might be especially strong. Finally, Xiao 
concludes that the non-tradable share reform confirms that larger difference between cash flow and 
control rights leads to the more unfavorable stock response. 
(Chen, Zhang, 2013) make an empirical examination of the relationship between the market 
valuation of firm assets, proxied by Tobin’s Q and the amount of firms’ asset productivity related 
information. The authors successfully attempt to quantify this information by means of R2 , by using 
the firm-specific regression of future firm’s earnings. They find statistically significant positive 
relationship between the R2 and the value of firm assets. The researches find these results consistent 
with the previous ideas stating that the mapping between accounting measurement of assets and 
earnings gives information about the firm asset’s productivity. Besides, among others, the authors 
scrutinize the relationship between firm value, measured by Tobin’s Q ratio and other variables, as 
sales, ROA and other firm and industry specific vectors of variables. 
(Vintila, Ghergina, 2014) studied Romanian market in regard of the association between 
ownership concentration and firm value. Based on a sample of local companies, traded on the 
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Bucharest Stock Exchange between 2007 and 2011, they estimate multivariate regression model. 
The authors measure out firm’s value by the Tobin’s Q ratio, adjusted in a such way to take into 
account the industry membership diversity. The ownership is considered separately for the first, 
second and the third largest shareholders of companies. It is done to sustain an inferior influence of 
first largest shareholder on firm value. The authors finally conclude that the first largest shareholder 
of a company discourages the existence of other investors holding large stakes. 
Studying the question of boardroom diversity, (Adams, Kirchmaeir, 2015) investigate how 
country-level factors posture for women barriers to boardrooms. The authors also demonstrate how 
measures of barriers explain the representation of women in the pool of directors within U.S. 
companies. This research results in suggestion of working full-time as an essential pre-condition for 
women to be a part of a boardroom. Among others the authors regress Tobin’s Q on the diversity of 
the board, size of the board, independence and firm-level controls.  
Based on the analysis of the sample consisted of 1,481 firms, (Adams, Verwijmeren, 2015) 
attempt to research how skills might cluster on and across boards. With further analysis of how firm 
performance relates to better commonality in skill sets, the authors characterize directors’ skill set 
through the special requirement of the U.S. companies about disclosure of the experience and 
qualification. Firm performance is proxied by the authors with Tobin’s Q ratio, which they express, 
in turn, as the book market of assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity and 
eventually divided by the book value of assets, which is consistent with the equation described in the 
previous section. 
(Dah, 2016) examines the association between the corporate governance in companies and 
the firm value during various phases of the business cycle. Among other important results, the 
authors show that industry turnover and managerial entrenchment differently affect the firm value. 
Firm value in his research is proxied by Tobin’s Q ratio. 
In another paper, (Kim, Park, Suh, 2016) investigate the relationship between dividends and 
firm value, proxied by Tobin’s Q. The authors find that the companies with the highest dividends 
paid are, on average, valued higher than others. Meanwhile, companies, which do not pay dividends 
at all, are on average valued higher than low-dividend-payers. In accordance with the findings, this 
relationship is very stable over the period between 1962 and 2010. 
(Bhandari, Javakhadze, 2017) study how the level of corporate social responsibility of 
companies influences the value. The authors find that CSR perverts sensitivity of a firm value to new 
investments. The authors proxy the firm value with Tobin’s Q, while measuring the latter as the 
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market value of equity, less the book value of equity, plus the book value of assets and rationed by 
the book value of assets. 
(Glaum, Kaiser, 2017) hypothesize that the relationship between company’s environmental, 
social and governance activities is mostly moderated by the level of disclosure. To stress this 
hypothesis, the authors conduct the regression analysis, while proxying ESG disclosure by the 
number of citations and the firm level by Tobin’s Q. Final findings of the researches indicate that the 
firm value increases with the strengthening of ESG.  
(Kim, Papanastassiou, Ngyuen, 2017) investigate how the employment of financial 
derivatives affect the firm value based on a sample of domestic firms, Multinational Corporations 
and foreign affiliates of MNCs. By using the sample totaling in 881 non-financial firms in eight 
countries, the authors study the relationship between corruption rate and the use of derivatives. The 
researches explore the impact of derivatives on firm value, proxied by Tobin’s Q ratio to be positive.  
1.3.2 Market-to-book ratio 
Market-to-book ratio was used by (Noe, Tice, 2009) who investigate the relationship between 
the stock liquidity and firm performance. Analyzing the sample of daily and monthly prices of stocks 
traded on NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ, the authors show that liquidity positively affects firm 
performance and operating profitability. To perform this analysis, Noe and Tice study the effect of 
stock trading decimalization on firm performance proxied by the market-to-book ratio. Further, they 
find the underlying mechanisms which could be responsible for this relationship.  
(Bates, Kahle, Stulz, 2009) by analyzing the companies of the U.S. market find that the 
average cash-to-assets ratio for industrial companies more than doubled for two decades since 1980. 
The authors emphasize that by the end of 2006 the average firm could retire all debt obligations with 
cash holdings. One of the highlights of this paper is that excessive cash holdings could subsequently 
decrease the firm value, measured by market-to-book value.  
Another research, where market-to-book value is used as a proxy for the profitability of the 
company is done by (Javed, Rao, Akram, Nazir, 2015), who examines the effect of financial 
leverage on different efficiency proxies. By scrutinizing the sample of 154 Pakistan textile firms 
over the period from 2006 to 2011, they indicate that the leverage negatively relates to the efficiency 
of firms. Moreover, the authors state that less borrowings will lead to the higher market-to-book 
value.  
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(Fosu, Ahmad, Coffee, 2015) assess how information asymmetry determines firm value and 
to what extent does this relationship is conditional on the level of leverage. The authors by using the 
dataset consisted of international companies drew the following hypothesizes: 
H1: Information asymmetry will be negatively related to firm value 
H2: The effect of information asymmetry on firm value is moderated by financial leverage 
H3: The adverse effect of leverage on firm value is moderated by information asymmetry 
H4: Information asymmetry will be more negatively related to firm value in the post-crisis 
period than in the pre-crisis period 
H5: The effect of information asymmetry on firm value is higher for firms with high growth 
opportunities 
 After stressing the whole set of hypotheses, the authors find that leverage negatively affects 
firm value and that for information asymmetric firms, the marginal effect is significantly lower. 
Among recent researches who investigated the determinants of firm value were (Yung, Jian, 
2017). Based on a sample of 20,125 firm-year observations between 1998 and 2013, the authors 
stressed the following hypotheses: 
H1: The shareholder base has a negative effect on firm value China 
The authors do not reject this hypothesis and rationalize it by the possible agency conflicts 
between individual investors and the controlling shareholder. As a proxy of firm value Yung and 
Jian use book-to-market value.  
Results of the literature analysis is presented on table 1.2. Conducted literature review 
revealed that despite the presence of the wide range of valuation approaches which could be used for 
measuring firm value, only a few of them is used in researches. First of all, none of the studies 
deploys fundamental valuation approaches. One may hypothesize that the use of DCFM and REM 
would be adequate for private companies, where assets should be priced by the researcher, due to 
absence of market information. Considering the fact, that all of the conducted researches relate to 
public companies, the use of market based firm value measures is suitable. Among market multiples, 
though, only a few valuation approaches are used for proxying firm value. Namely, Market-to-book 
and Tobin’s Q are used to proxy the value of firm. Although, all of these measures are aimed at 
estimating market value of assets in comparison with their book value, use of Tobin’s Q significantly 
prevails. 
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Table 1.2 Summary of firm value proxying approaches in literature 
Multiples 
Application 
in researches 
Enterprise 
Multiples 
Application in 
researches 
Fundame-
-ntal 
Valuation 
Application in 
researches 
Price-to-earnings - EV/EBITDA - DCFM - 
Price-to-sales - EV/EBIT - DDM - 
Price-to-book - EV/Sales - ROIM - 
Price-to-cash 
flow 
- 
 
 REM - 
Price-to-
dividends 
-      
Tobin’s Q +      
Market-to-book +      
EV/EBITDA -      
EV/EBIT -      
EV/Sales -      
 
Based on the literature review, Tobin’s Q ratio proved to be the most adequate ratio for 
proxying firm value. Furthermore, based on the reviewed literature a set of control variables is 
chosen for the baseline model. The table presented in appendix 3 introduces variables reflecting the 
baseline model. 
Summary 
 The main purpose of this chapter was to define the adequate approach for firm valuation in 
the context of the study of the relationship between private benefits of control and firm value. To 
reach the goal, in current chapter the following was done.  
As a first step, theoretical background of different valuation approaches is provided. For each 
of the existent metrics, calculation technique is presented and major pros and cons are explained.  
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As a second step, thorough analysis of the current literature, which explores determinants of 
firm value is proposed. Finally, based on the findings, Tobin’s Q ratio is chosen as the most adequate 
and widely used measure of private benefits of control. 
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CHAPTER 2. PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL. MEASUREMENT APPROACHES  
2.1 Concept of Private Benefits of Control  
According to (Nenova, 2003) topics related to private benefits of control started their 
development since the influence of an ownership concentration on firms’ performance was 
mentioned. (Berle, Means, 1932) were first who suggested that the control of a company may give 
management an opportunity to use it in favor of their personal interests. However, intensive 
extension of the topic was undertaken by (Jensen, Meckling, 1976) focusing on agency problem. 
Many researches asserted that managers owning a stake in a company may have an ability to gain 
welfare disproportional with their actual ownership (Fama, Jensen, 1983), (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 
1985). In 1987 Grossman and Hart scrutinized the difference between prices of voting and non-
voting shares and concluded that the presence of dual-class stock structure may be an indirect 
evidence of expropriation of minority shareholders in a company. Later (Barclay, Holderness, 
1989) while investigating the data on acquisitions made on New-York stock market assumed that 
the premia paid for block trades might be a signal of presence of private benefits of control 
consumed exclusively by the block holders. Among those papers are (Shleifer, Vyshny, 1986), 
(Stulz, 1987), (Harris, Raviv, 1988), (Castelino, 1990), (Zingales, 1994, 1995).  
Later, Dyck and Zingales (Dyck, Zingales, 2004) depicted private benefits of control as 
“some value, whatever the source, is not shared among all the shareholders in proportion of the 
shares owned, but it is enjoyed exclusively by the party in control”. 
Current literature suggests that in a company a stakeholder of private benefits of control is 
either a block holder or a managing party. From the one hand, block shareholders can obtain 
exclusive benefits inaccessible to minorities. Potentially, they can refuse welfare maximization 
through the increase of a firm capitalization and opt for the deliberate undermining of minority 
rights to increase their personal benefit. For example, block shareholders can take a management 
position and substantially increase compensation for themselves (Shleifer, Vishny, 1986). Besides, 
there is a variety of approaches for the control party to gain personal benefits, such as property 
theft or illegal assets and inventory liquidation for understated prices.  
From the other side, managers may also use their position to manipulate the business in a 
way that is beneficial exclusively for them to the detriment of shareholders (Dyck, Zingales, 2004). 
Top management could purchase amenities or have excessive compensation. To protect 
themselves from losing the access to private benefits of control, managers could preventively 
undertake inefficient actions such as “golden parachute” to be insured in case of the possible 
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acquisition. (Hwang, Hu, 2009) provided an evidence that potentially, managers could get more 
private benefits from their position than controlling shareholders, which makes managers-owners 
more dangerous than ordinary block shareholders. 
Although, it is merely impossible to understand what portion of PBC is related to a certain 
source, many authors made an attempt to provide a taxonomy of them. In accordance with the 
commonly accepted classification, private benefits could be divided into tangible and intangible. 
Tangibles include compensation or purchase of amenities, while the latter is best described by 
(Jensen, Meckling, 1976): «benefits he derives from pecuniary returns but also the utility 
generated by various non-pecuniary aspects of his entrepreneurial activities such as the physical 
appointment of the office, the attractiveness of the office staff, the level of employee discipline, the 
kind and amount of charitable contributions, personal relations (“friendship”, “respect”, and so 
on) with employees, a larger than optimal computer to play with, or purchase of production inputs 
from friends”. 
(Ehrhardt, Nowak, 2001) examined the existence of private benefits of control in Germany. 
The authors derived a typology of PBC from the literature and empirically measured which of 
them take place in Germany. According to their study, there are three possible ways of extracting 
private benefits for block holders, namely: excessive management compensation (self-dealing), 
enjoyment through association with luxury goods (amenties) and other social benefits and 
amusements, valuable in small towns where companies operate (reputation). Complete taxonomy 
of private benefits by Ehrhardt and Nowak is shown in the table, presented in appendix 2. 
Some authors highlight that private benefits could be extracted by individuals. During the 
period of privatization, large foreign investors might strive for acquiring local companies to create 
so-called “pioneer’s advantage” for themselves. The purpose of this action could be the desire of 
the acquirer to maximize the welfare of its current shareholders to the detriment of target’s 
shareholders, right up to the instant shut-down of the target company just after the acquisition 
(Cornelli, Li, 1997). In accordance with another taxonomy, the effect of private benefits of control 
on shareholders’ welfare is ambiguous. The presence of PBC may affect investors both positively 
and negatively (Sepe, 2010). 
2.2. Measurement of Private Benefits of Control 
Private benefits of control by their nature imply immeasurability. (Muravyev, 2007) 
mentions that if PBC could be easily evaluated they would instantly lose their “privacy” and 
minorities could conduct a lawsuit against the controlling party or the corporation. As soon as 
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there is no such approach to determine exact value of PBC, while analyzing private benefits of 
control authors pay special attention to an approach upon which PBC are measured. Current theory 
suggests two approaches to measuring private benefits of control: the first one studies the premia 
paid for control blocks, while the second one measure the difference in prices between voting and 
non-voting shares, both of which will be further depicted. In two following sections, the most 
topical papers, where both approaches were deployed are presented.  
2.2.1 Control premium approach 
The first attempt to estimate PBS quantitively is undertaken by (Holderness, Barclay, 1989). 
Authors assume that unless welfare of a company is distributed evenly among shareholders, 
control block should be traded with discount due to additional expenses associated with holding 
the block. Otherwise, positive premia signaling that the block provides an acquirer with exclusive 
benefits. Analyzing 63 block trades on New-York stock market the authors conclude that the 
premia of at least 20% to the pre-announcement day is paid in 80% of trades.   
Later (Dyck, Zingales, 2004) formalize this approach and apply it on a sample of 393 trades 
in 39 countries from 1990 to 2000. One of the drawbacks of the approach suggested by 
(Holderness, Barclay, 1989) is its’ inability to distinguish private benefits of control from the 
natural growth. News regarding the new owner may have the positive impact on investors’ 
expectations about future synergies with the consequent increase of premia paid. Later, many 
papers in which authors tried to alter this approach were published. The most noticeable are 
(Albuquerque, Schroth, 2009) and (Barak, Lauterbach, 2011), who suggested to calculate premia 
as the sum of average private benefits for a buyer and a seller.  
Further development of this approach was conducted with the paper of (Albuquerque, 
2009), who proposed new structural model, that according to their study solved three main 
problems encountered with the “control transfer” approach. First, they pointed out that the solution 
for the problem depicted earlier by (Dyck, Zingales, 2004) does not embody the possibility of 
simultaneous increase of private benefits of control with the share price. Second, the authors 
criticize the approach in which the discount devoted to an acquirer of the block is taken into 
account as a negative realization of the premia paid for buying the controlling stake. Third, it is 
mentioned that many studies are potentially subjects to the biasness due to the fact that private 
benefits of control are analyzed on in the target companies in which the controlling block was sold.  
Despite the criticism of the approach proposed by (Dyck, Zingales, 2004) and 
(Albuquerque, Schroth, 2009), this approach is used in a large number of studies related to a wide 
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range of objectives, since it allows to specify the nature of premia paid. Unlike the voting premium 
approach, control premium paid in a transaction is a consequence of the fact that the control was 
transferred at a price higher than the market price. Below we will consider the number of papers 
where this approach to measure private benefits of control is deployed. 
(Burkart, ,Gromb, Panunzi, 2000) develop the model for the analysis of control transfer 
transactions in companies with one dominant minority shareholder. An empirical study shows that 
direct sales of a controlling stake leads to higher private benefits of control, in distinction from 
acquisitions through buying company shares on the market. Despite this fact, often the parties 
prefer direct selling of a controlling stake to exclude the free-riding problem of the dispersed 
shareholders.  
In their study, (Hanouna, Sarin, Shapiro, 2001) attempt to separate the cost of controlling 
the company from the costs related to the cash flow rights retention. Using the sample of 9,566 
acquisitions of public companies in the period from 1986 to 2000 from G7 countries (US, Japan, 
Germany, France, Italy, UK and Canada), the authors analyze the premium paid in deals. They 
conclude that in the U.S., buying a stake that provides its’ owner with the majority votes associated 
with the average premium of 20-30% which is significantly more than the price paid for a similar 
block that does not provide such voting power. Similar findings are made for other countries in the 
G7, where the median value of the premium is also at the level of 20-30%.  The feature of this 
study in its attempt to consider countries in the context of market-oriented and bank-oriented types. 
According to the authors, bank oriented countries are less exposed to the agency problem and, as a 
result, have a smaller size of private benefits of control.  
(Dyck, Zingales, 2004) construct the measure for the PBC based on the sample of 393 
control transactions in 39 countries. The authors reveal that the average value of private benefits of 
control equals 14% and ranges between -4% and +65%. Major finding of the paper is the analysis 
of institutions that are the most important in curbing private benefits of control. In accordance with 
the research, high degree of statutory protection of shareholders associated with lower levels of 
private benefits of control. 
Based on a sample of 250 transactions, conducted in the U.S. between 1990 and 2006, 
(Albuquerque, Schroth, 2009) examine the major determinants of private benefits of control. 
According to the results of the analysis, it is revealed that the size of the stake which is being sold 
has the greatest influence on the size of private benefits of control. In addition, cash on the balance 
sheet of the company also increases the size of private benefits of control, confirming the 
27 
 
hypothesis of aggravation of the agency problem due to a large amount of the free cash. Suggested 
evidences support the idea that the block premium or discount is dependent on the controlling 
block holder’s ability to clash for the tender offer for the target’s stock.  
The topic of private benefits of control, and in particular their study based on the control 
premium approach, started its extensive development with the investigation of developed markets. 
The existence of working minority shareholders’ protection mechanisms should exclude the 
possibility of their expropriation by the holders of controlling stakes. Many studies conducted 
based on the U.S. and European companies’ samples indicate the ineffectiveness of the legislative 
system with regard to excluding the possibility of expropriation. In addition, agency problem 
remains essential. The number of papers demonstrates the fact that managers of the company use 
their power for personal enrichment purposes.  
(Poulsen, 2011) presents an analytical framework to determine whether the seller or the 
buyer in block transactions value private benefits higher. To provide such analysis, the author tests 
the following hypothesizes: 
H1: Absent toeholds, the transaction premium increases (or decreases) in the block’s 
relative voting power 
H2: The transaction premium increases in the presence of toeholds 
While using voting rights as the vehicle for PBC, the authors find that the selling 
shareholders in block transactions are tend to attach more value to private benefits than the buying 
party does.  
(Belanes, Raoudha, Omru, 2011) test the control premium approach, which had proved its 
validity on the U.S. market by (Barclay, Holderness, 1989) on the French market. Drawing on an 
extensive sample of 110 block trades, the authors highlight the simultaneous relationship between 
block ownership and private benefits. In this paper researches use two proxies for PBC, namely: 
excessive compensation of managers and the amount of related-party transactions. The authors 
concluded that despite the traditional assumptions of the literature, the relationship between block 
ownership and the size of PBC is self reinforcing rather than unidirectional.  
(Barak, Lauterbach, 2011) set a goal to adapt the standard model proposed by (Holderness, 
Barclay, 1989) of private benefits of control for partial control transactions. Based on a sample of 
54 Israeli companies, the researchers demonstrate that using the standard approach for the deals 
with partial control transfer of control can shift the PBC estimate by more than two times. The 
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adaptation proposed by the authors of this approach avoids bias in the measurement of PBCs by 
the control transfer approach. 
Same goal is set by (Intrisano, 2012) who estimates the benefit of control based on a sample 
of Italian companies, given the fact that previous empirical researches evidenced high private 
benefits of control among Italian companies. The main idea of the research is to show that 
Consolidated Law on Finance introduced in 1998 significantly changed the protection of minority 
shareholders. The author empirically proves that the average percentage of PBC dropped to 5% of 
the capital. This conclusion, however, is based on the assumption that the Consoldated Law 
requires several years to produce the desired results. Despite the meaningful conclusion, the author 
did not provide any information regarding the process of isolating the effect of the new law from 
other macro-factors affecting the amount of private benefits of control.  
(Albuquerque, Schroth, 2010) by using the modified approach of (Holderness, Barclay, 
1989) developed the search model of controlling block trades, which can value the illiquidity of 
stakes. Proposed model considers several illiquidity dimensions. Within the first dimension, cases 
when a block holder is forced to sell her stake to a less efficient acquirer are highlighted. Second 
dimension considers the situation when a sale occurs at a fire sale price. And third implies that 
absent a liquidity shock, a trade could occur only when a potential acquirer arrives. Based on the 
sample of U.S. companies, the authors give better estimate of value of control, which includes 
liquidity/illiquidity estimate of the controlling stake.  
Of special interest for the current research are developing countries, and in particular those 
that are on the stage of transition economy. (Dyck, Zingales, 2004) noted that in countries with the 
underdeveloped mechanisms for regulating the market for corporate control, the size and the 
magnitude of PBC may significantly exceed those in developed countries. Number of studies for 
emerging markets will be considered below, in which the PBC assessment using the control 
premium approach was preferable. 
(Weifeng, 2008) investigates the effect of the ownership structure on the size of private 
benefits of control. By means of the control premium approach, the author measures the size of 
PBC, equal, on average to 18,52% of the value of the company in China and found a significant 
relationship between the presence of a controlling shareholder and the amount of private benefits 
of control. The research is conducted based on cases on Chinese market, where there were stock 
transactions which both involved the transfer of control and did not. Arguing about the main 
determinants of private benefits of control, the author notes that the size of a firm measured as a 
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natural logarithm of all total assets of a company has a positive relationship with the size of private 
benefits of control.  
(Gianfrante, Zanetti, 2010) conduct an analysis of the banking sector in 40 countries to 
determine the impact of legislation on the size of private benefits of control. According to the 
research, the regulation of banks has a significant impact on the possibility of expropriation of 
minority shareholders. Depending on the level of the development of legislative initiatives, the 
premiums paid for the deals are ranged from -15% in the Czech Republic to 67% in Turkey. 
The effect of ownership concentration on the size of private benefits of control was also 
confirmed for the Romanian market (Dragota, Lipara, Ciobanu, 2013). Using the regression 
analysis, the authors prove the hypothesis that there is positive relationship between stock liquidity 
and the size of the absorbed share. At the same time, number of hypothesizes concerning the 
relationship between private benefits of control and the size of the company, the country of origin, 
the form of organization of the absorbed party, was rejected. The study results in the main finding, 
stating that the presence of a shareholder owning more than 33% of the company’s shares 
significantly increases the size of private benefits of control.  
(Byrka-Kita, Czerwinski, 2015) analyze Polish market to determine the value of private 
benefits of control in the period from 1996 to 2014 by using the research methodology proposed 
by (Holderness, Barclay, 1989). Based on the analysis of 175 transaction, where more than 5% of 
votes were sold, the authors empirically prove that the block premium in Poland market ranged 
from 4.41% to 10.52%.  
(Jurfest, Paredes, Ruitort, 2015) research the Chilean market for private benefits of control 
and attempt to determine the relationship between reforms carried out in the country on PBC. In 
2000, takeover rules of the Chilean market have been changed from the market rule, which stated 
that the market could be sold for any price. Based on a sample of 43 acquisitions in Chile, the 
authors demonstrate that PBC, as a part of the premium paid during the control transfer, felt by 
approximately 1/3 as a result of legislation changes.  
Reviewed papers confirm that private benefits of control are of the concern for the 
researchers studying developed as well as emerging markets. Moreover, control premium approach 
is being actively used to investigate the presence of private benefits of control. However, worth 
noting, that the nature of this approach does not imply the possibility of effective search of 
relationships. Most of the studies are concentrated on the analysis of the premia determinants and 
on subtraction of the PBC effect on this premium. 
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2.2.2 Voting Premium approach 
The second approach to measure PBC is based on the difference between voting and non-
voting shares. First who noted this difference were (Lease et al., 1983). Generally, no arbitrage 
principle implies that two shares providing its’ holders with similar income should be equally 
priced. However, should the voting right be estimated by the market with the premia, it should 
provide it holder with additional cash flow. In further studies, the difference between the price of 
two types of shares is explained by the difference in voting rights or liquidity of shares. 
Differences in voting rights are considered either in the context of the control contest model or the 
possible expropriation of non-voting shareholders by voting (Mutavyev, 2007).  
Currently, the most common explanation for this difference in prices was suggested by 
(Grossman, Hart, 1988). According to their ideas, investors, holding voting shares demand premia 
for their stakes, having an understanding that their stake might be crucial for establishing control 
over the company and extracting private benefits of control. The same year, Italian economist 
Castelino noted essential difference in prices of voting and non-voting shares on Milan stock 
exchange (Castelino, 1989). Later, Zingales while exploring PBC as a part of control contest 
model suggested formalized approach for valuing private benefits of control based on the 
estimation of the voting premium. In accordance with this model, initial owner of a company 
arriving at a decision of initial public offering has an opportunity to register two share classes: 
voting and non-voting. This mechanism admits her to sell cash flow rights and voting rights 
separately, thereby producing possibility of selling private benefits of control for premium. This 
approach was later adjusted for quantifying PBC by (Zingales, 1995). In his paper, he described 
three determinants of PBC: the relative size of the private benefits of control, the probability of a 
control contest, and the fraction of the voting stock in the company’s equity.  
The use of this model is preceded by the number of assumptions (Muravyev, 2007). First, a 
company must have two types of shares, the same in all respects, except the right to vote. 
Secondly, there must be a struggle in the market for gaining control over the company. Thirdly, the 
offer to purchase a company’s stake should include both voting and non-voting shares.  
Voting premium approach evolved in analyses of developed markets, where companies 
often issued two classes of shares to retain control over the company without additional 
investments. The main rationale behind issuing two classes of shares often happens to be the desire 
of founders to preserve private benefits, whilst increasing capitalization. (Erhardt, Nowak, 2003) 
cite the German market as a bright example, where most of the companies with dual class structure 
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in the former were controlled by families. This situation is common for the countries with 
developed mechanism of corporate governance and mature market economies. 
After Zingales’s paper was published, the further development of the voting premium 
approach was evolved by (Rydqvist, 1996). The author studies the influence of ownership structure 
on the voting premium. The empirical analysis of the Swedish market reveals that the voting 
premium is substantially higher in companies where the two largest shareholders have equal stakes 
in a company. According to the authors conclusions, it happens due to the permanent contest over 
control among shareholders, which is thereby confirms the idea of control contest model, 
suggested by (Grossman, Hart, 1988). 
(Gompers, Ishii, Metrick, 2008) by using the voting premium approach quantify the 
relationship between the presence of an owner-manager and a firm value in the US market. By 
deploying regression analysis, the authors receive a significant positive relationship between the 
firm value and the concentration of cash flow rights in hands of managers-owners and negative 
with the increase in their rights to vote. Although the findings of the study do not directly indicate 
the relationship between PBC and firm value, it can be concluded that the size of the voting 
premium indirectly affects it, being a market of the existence of the control contest and 
consequently of private benefits of control. 
Based on the voting premium approach, (Guadalupe, Perez-Gonzalez, 2010) investigate the 
influence of competition on private benefits of control. The authors test this effect by using two 
indices measuring the level of product and input market anti-competitive regulations. By using the 
dataset of 586 firms in 10 developed and 6 emerging markets, they present the following findings: 
(1) higher intensity of competition within the country leads to lower estimates of private benefits 
of control (2) competition reduces the dispersion of PBC (3) competition has a better impact on 
reducing PBC in countries prominent in weak-rule-of-law, in manufacturing industries and mostly 
in less-profitable firms. 
Interesting results were obtained by (Holmen, 2011) who investigates the reaction of the 
Stockholm stock market to lifting the ban on trading for foreign investors in 1993. After new law 
was introduced, companies with two classes of shares started to bargain at a discount. In his study, 
the author stresses two hypotheses based on a sample of 208 companies: 
H1: The discount at which company is being traded associated with the presence of non-
voting shares 
H2: Voting premium was increased after the new law was introduced 
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The author claims that the period after 1993 is not characterized by an increase in the 
expropriation of shareholders. Thus, foreign investors expect that in companies with two classes of 
shares there will be an expropriation of minority shareholders, regardless of the real fact pointing 
this out.  
(Salzman, Soypak, 2017) examine how culture relates to the size of private benefits of 
control. As the cultural determinants, the authors choose two basic factors of organization behavior 
of Hofstede: the distance of power (the degree of participation in decision-making) and 
individualism-collectivism in society. The study tests hypotheses regarding the influence of the 
power distance and individualism-collectivism on the size of PBC, measure by the voting premium 
approach. Both of the hypotheses were not rejected. The first one testifies that the higher 
participation of the authorities in life of the society, the more uneven distribution of benefits 
among shareholders of a company will take place. The second confirms the positive impact of 
individualism in society on reduction of private benefits of control.  
The use of two classes of shares is also common in emerging markets. Unlike developed 
countries, in countries where economy is still in transition, two classes of shares in companies can 
be used as a government step toward maintaining the control over the corporation. There is a 
number of studies, including the study of the private benefits of control and their measurement by 
using the voting premium approach, which will be discussed below.  
(Saito, Silveira, 2010) analyzed 87 Brazilian companies between 1995 and 2006, attempting 
to determine how the introduction of tag-along right and the availability of family control are 
interrelated with the size of PBC. The authors by using voting premium approach conduct the 
regression analysis and confirm the hypothesis regarding the negative impact of the new law on the 
size of private benefits of control. Family control, in accordance with these results, leads to larger 
PBC. The authors of the study, further stress the hypothesis regarding the negative influence of the 
state ownership on the size of PBC. Despite the reasonable assumption that the presence of a state 
among shareholders should reduce the probability of takeover, this hypothesis was rejected.  
The study of the Brazilian market is further extended by (Souza, Fernandes, 2014), who set 
the goal to measure the size of private benefits of control by using the voting premium approach. 
Conducted analysis revealed that the average voting premium among Brazailin companies over the 
period 2003-2013 was equal to 11.41%. Among the statistically significant determinants of PBC 
were liquidity, dividend payout, tag-alone right, quality of corporate governance and the presence 
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of a controlling shareholder. Other studies of the Brazailian market (Fernandes, 2014), (Scherrer, 
Fernandes, 2016) also use the voting premium approach.  
(Muravyev, Berezinets, Illina, 2014) examine the impact of size and composition of the 
board of directors on corporate governance, by using private benefits of control as an indicator of 
problems related to the corporate governance. After analyzing the sample consisting of Russian 
companies and having two classes of shares in the period from 1998 to 2009, the authors made the 
number of important conclusions for the corporate governance topic. Among other key findings of 
the paper are: confirmation of the preferred use of private benefits of control as a measure of 
corporate governance issues, non-linear dependence of performance on the size of the board of 
directors and the positive relationship between the number of independent directors and PBC.  
The existence of a multitude of papers deploying different approaches to evaluate private 
benefits of control suggests that none of the approaches is universal and should be selected in 
accordance with the research goal and objectives. Nevertheless, each of the approaches has its pros 
and cons. For example, (Nicodano, Sembenelli, 2004) criticize the control premium approach in 
their research, claiming that it gives a biased assessment. The authors empirically prove that the 
model for estimating PBC through premiums in block trades underestimates PBC by 10.9%. In 
addition, an important drawback of this approach is the related difficulty in separating the effect of 
private benefits of control from the effect of the expected increase in cash flow resulting from 
synergies. In this regard, the thorough analysis of each trade is required in understanding the nature 
of premium in transactions. 
At the same time, (Benos, Weisbach, 2004) note that the voting premium approach can 
potentially overestimate the size of private benefits of control. The fact of the presence of two 
classes of shares indirectly indicates about the presence of PBC, and therefore the sample of 
companies that have voting and non-voting shares will include a disproportionally large number of 
companies with large private benefits of control. Voting premium approach is also criticized by 
(Barak, Lauterbach, 2011). Following their arguments, the weak side of this approach is that it 
leads only to averaged estimation. And, finally, (Weifang, 2008) argues that the reason for 
rejecting the voting premium approach is its inapplicability on Chinese market, where companies 
were prohibited from issuing two classes of shares until recently.  
2.3 Relationship between private benefits of control and firm value 
Ever since the principal-agent problem has been introduced, opinions regarding the effect of 
the controlling owner divided into two camps, because, in theory, majority shareholder may 
34 
 
influence the firm value differently. With respect to the first point of view, majority shareholder 
may be a constraint for the management to use the capital in favor of their personal interests. The 
second point of view states that the majority shareholders will have the opposite effect, by 
providing the controlling shareholders with an ability to expropriate minorities. (Jensen, Meckling, 
1976) were first followers of an idea of monitoring role of controlling shareholder. They 
considered the problem of the ownership concentration and its’ relationship with performance. 
Among other conclusions, authors asserted positive impact of ownership concentration on firm 
value. Same idea was proved by (Shliefer, Vyshny, 1986) who also found positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance. Others (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 1985), 
(Grossman, Hart, 1988), (Harris, Raviv, 1988) analyzed this problem within the problem of 
deviation from “one share – one vote” structure. These authors defended the opposite. According 
to their studies, any deviation from “one share – one vote” structure is a sign of an expropriation.  
In a situation where one share corresponds to one vote, the struggle for control will help to form 
the most effective team of managers and the fair distribution of the private benefits of the buyer to 
a controlling stake among all shareholders. Conclusions of (Holderness, Sheehan, 1988) based on 
the empirical analysis of 114 New York companies, also contradict the assertion that majority 
shareholders expropriate minorities. The size of the investment, the reorganization of company’s 
structure, profitability and the Tobin’s Q are equal for the companies with concentrated and 
dispersed ownership structures, which indirectly indicates the absence of expropriation of minority 
shareholders.  
It is important to note that the very fact of the existence of private benefits does not lead to 
inefficiency in company’s processes with the consequent decrease of performance of firm value. 
First of all, private benefits of control can be the most effective way of obtaining additional value. 
In a situation where the controlling shareholder does not see a possible strategy that allows for 
additional profit, the acquirer, who is aware of this possibility, can effectively use it. In this 
situation, the overall welfare of all shareholders will be increased. Second, their presence may lead 
to a more intense struggle for control, also potentially improving the position of all shareholders 
(Grossman, Hart, 1980). 
In accordance with another point of view, the presence of a majority shareholder can lead to 
the opposite effect, in which the controlling shareholder will own the private benefits of control to 
the detriment of minority shareholders. As noted by (Fama, Jensen, 1983), a company where the 
manager simultaneously holds the position of the controlling shareholder has the opportunity to 
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expropriate assets and cash flows. Concentration of the ownership in the hands of the management 
also reduces the probability of a successful takeover of the company, forcing the management to 
protect their positions (Stulz, 1988).  
It is known that the presence of two types of shares may indicate the existence of private 
benefits of control, as it allows an owner to retain voting rights without additional investment in 
increasing her stake. In this regard, two types of shares could be considered as an indirect 
indication of PBCs. To give the better outlook on the question, dual class structure as a concept is 
depicted below. 
Dual class stock structure is the type of share division, which implies different voting rights 
for different classes of shares. The result of this division is the deviation from “socially 
acceptable” one share – one vote structure with the further inequality among shareholders. As a 
result, scholars paid attention to this concept. The idea that dual class stock structure might signal 
about the presence of private benefits of control was first suggested by (Castellino, 1989) who 
noted that voting and non-voting shares trade at different price, which contradicted to established 
principle of financial economics. According to the fundamental principles, share price ought to 
reflect the present value of future dividends, discounted by the discount factor reflecting the risk 
premium.  
From the other hand, (Alchian and Demzets, 1972) state that: “in fact, we invest in some ventures 
in the hope that no other stockholders will be so “foolish” as to try to toss out the incumbent 
management. We want him to have the power to stay in office, and for the prospect of sharing in 
his fortunes we buy nonvoting common stock.  
Below, a set of papers, discussing the issue of private benefits of control in the context of 
the dual class structure companies is presented. 
Among one of the most perceptible studies is the paper of (Burkart, Lee, 2008). In their 
research they mention that dual class stock structure could reduce the free-rider issue widely-
spread in many firms with single class share structure and enhance the takeover activity, yet only 
when there is only one bidder.  
In 2003, based on a sample of 105 IPOs on German stock market from 1970 to 1991, 
(Erhardt, Nowak, 2003) empirically prove that dual-class companies underperform in comparison 
with identical companies, having only voting shares. Authors show that the separation of voting 
and cash flow rights through the issuance of preferred shares is often used to create controlling 
structure, where private benefits will be preserved. Underperformance is revealed not only in terms 
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of investors’ expectations, namely share price, but also in operational performance. Profitability of 
those companies is, on average, 4% lower than in identical companies without cash flow and 
voting rights separation. 
After analyzing 493 companies on US market, 108 of which unified share structure, (Maury, 
Pajuste, 2007) conclude that the probability of a transaction directly depends on the number of 
factors. The authors are confident that the decision to abandon non-voting shares depends on the 
size of private benefits of control that the owner might potentially lose. Even though there is a lack 
of efficiency discrepancy between companies with dual and single class structures, the rejection of 
non-voting shares leads to an increase in firm value during the first year after the unification 
procedure.  
Same results were obtained by (Gompers, 2008), who constructs and analyzes the list of US 
dual-class companies and further uses it to research the relationship between insider ownership and 
firm value. The author separately evaluates cash-flow and voting rights and by deploying single-
stage regression find that increase in insider’s cash-flow rights and decrease in her voting rights 
leads to increase of the firm value.  
(Doidge, et al, 2009) analyzed a sample of 4,275 non-financial organizations with a 
capitalization higher than $10 million. In their paper, they test two hypotheses: 
H1: Control wedge – the difference between voting rights and control rights leads to a 
decrease in firm value 
H2: Foreign companies traded in the US stock market have a higher firm value 
The fact that tested hypotheses are not rejected indirectly suggests that the presence of PBCs 
in this case, described by the concentration of control in the hands of the owner and the refusal of 
listing on the US exchange, leads to a decrease in firm value.  
More detailed examination of private benefits of control started with the studies describing 
the relationship between concentration of ownership on firm value. In this regard, at this moment 
there are many studies aimed at obtaining results on the relationship between the degree of 
concentration and firm value, some of which will be discussed below.  
(Maury, Pajuste, 2005) demonstrate that the firm value depends on the interaction between 
the owners of the largest stakes of the company. The authors of the research confirm the widely 
spread in literature opinion that the presence of a controlling shareholders leads to a decrease in 
firm value. An interesting observation is made by the authors in regard of the monitoring function 
of the third major shareholder in the company. According to the research, a coalition of two 
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holders of the largest blocks of shares (>10%) adversely affects the firm value due to their 
potential ability to engage in the expropriation of minority shareholders. However, the presence of 
a third major shareholder leads to an increase in firm value, as it starts to perform a monitoring role 
in managing the company and prevents organization of coalitions.  
(Hoi, Robin, 2010) accomplish the research regarding the determinants of firm value. In 
their study authors seek to understand how the proximity of the largest shareholder (whether the 
controller has a top executive position, a member of the board or an outside stakeholder) 
influences the firm value. By using as a proxy of the firm value market-to-book ratio, Hoi and 
Robin reveal that ownership concentration coupled with the high control proximity reduces firm 
value. Thus, the more the control party participating in managing the company, the more 
opportunities it has for the expropriation of minorities. 
However, (Liu, Uchida, Yang, 2011) mention that a manager-owner, on average, had a 
positive effect on the company performance during the post-crisis period. In accordance with their 
empirical study, manager-owner restricted expropriation in companies, where government owned 
the stake.  
(Krausel, Lucas, 2010) revisit the studies of (La Porta, et al, 2002) and (Maury, Pajuste, 
2005) exclusively for the US market, demonstrating the significant negative relationship between 
concentration of ownership and Tobin’s Q.  
(Nguyen, Nielsen, 2012) use alternative estimates for private benefits of control. In order to 
conduct an analysis, they gather the data about 385 deaths of controlling shareholders. After 
identifying 115 of them as “sudden”, the authors conduct an event study analysis. On average, the 
market reacts negatively on a death of the shareholders with a low ownership stake (-5%) and 
positively on a death of a holder of the large stake (+4%). Positive and significant relationship 
between a manager-owner and a firm value levels with the increase of manager-owner’s stake. The 
utilized approach excluded the problem of endogeneity in relationship between firm value and 
ownership.  
Some of the papers where the research between private benefits of control and a firm value 
on emerging markets was conducted has to be mentioned.  
(Abdullah, Shah, Khan 2012) proved that in Pakistan controlling shareholder may have a 
monitoring role. Tobin’s Q in such companies is significantly higher in companies with a 
shareholder, holding more than 50% of a stake. Same idea was proved by (Muravyev, Berezinets, 
Ilina, 2014). In this paper they found out significant relationship between the size of private 
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benefits of control and Tobin’s Q. At the same time Malaysian researches do not find significance 
in relationship between the ownership concentration and firm value (Hassam et al. 2016).  
(La Porta, et al., 2002) introduces the model aimed at testing the effects of legal protection 
of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling shareholders on the valuation 
of firms. By using this model, the authors tested a sample of 371 large firms from 27 wealthy 
economies. In accordance with this model, better protection of minority shareholders leads to a 
higher valuation of firms. By using Tobin’s Q as a proxy of firm value, they test the following 
hypothesizes:  
H1: Firms in more protective legal regions should have higher Tobin’s Q  
H2: Firms with higher cash flow ownership by the controlling entrepreneur should have 
higher Tobin’s Q  
H3: Firms with better investment opportunities should have higher Tobin’s Q  
H4: For the quadratic cost-of-theft function, the effect of the entrepreneur’s cash flow 
ownership valuation is lower in countries with good investor protection.   
Based on a sample of 371 large companies in 27 developed economies, the authors show 
that more developed protection mechanisms for minority investors have positive influence on firm 
value. Perfect legal protection stimulates individuals to invest more directly in companies, having 
the positive impact on the whole stock market.  
(Belkhir, Boubaker, Derouiche, 2014) assert that for the companies with dual-class share 
structure excess of cash might lead to increased agency costs and consequent reduce of firm value. 
Large cash accounts increase the potential risk that it will be used in favor of management’s 
personal interests.  
Later, (Cheng, Huang, 2015) suggest the index to measure private benefits of control, which 
is based on thirteen characteristics of the organization, the CEO of the company and the industry in 
which a company operates. By using this indicator of PBC presence, the authors test several 
hypotheses regarding the negative relationship between PBC and (1) stock return, (2) firm value 
expressed through Tobin’s Q, (3) operational effectiveness and positive with (4) leverage, (5) 
CEO’s compensation. According to the results of the study, the authors do not reject any of the 
stated hypotheses. Thus, this study also confirms the possible negative relationship of private 
benefits of control with Tobin’s Q.  
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Conducted review of the literature exploring the relationship between private benefits of 
control and different proxies of firm value could be condensed into the results presented on table 
2.1 below. 
Table 2.1 Literature review of papers studying the relationship between PBC and firm value  
Dependent 
Variable 
Expected Sign Empirical Support 
Profitability 
+ Private Benefits and Minority Shareholder Expropriation. Ehrhardt, 
Nowak (2001) 
Firm Value 
- Private Benefits and Minority Shareholder Expropriation. Ehrhardt, 
Nowak (2001) 
Firm Value 
- Extreme Governance An Analysis of Dual Class Companies in the United 
States. Gompers (2008)  
Firm Value 
- Agency Conflicts, Controlling Owner Proximity, and Firm Value. An 
Analysis of Dual‐Class Firms in the United States. Hoi, Robin (2010)  
Firm 
Performance 
- 
Blockholder Dispersion and Firm Value.Konijn, Krausel, Lucas (2010)  
Firm 
Performance 
+ Corporate Governance and Firm Value During the Global Financial 
Crisis. Evidence from China. Liu, Uchida, Yang (2011)  
Firm Value 
- Firm Performance and the Nature of Agency Problems in Insiders-
Controlled Firms. Evidence from Pakistan. Abdullah, Shah, Khan (2012)  
Firm Value 
- Private Control Benefits and Corporate Performance and Policies. Chen, 
Huang (2015) 
 
 As it could be inferred from the table, there is a number of studies exploring the relationship 
between private benefits of control and firm performance or profitability. However, based on the 
analysis of the literature on firm valuation approaches, it is known that in most cases researchers 
use same proxies for value and performance.  
 Based on the analyzed literature, it is assumed that private benefits of control should 
negatively relate to firm value. This is an intuitive assumption, reflecting the primary concept of 
private benefits of control, stating that a controlling party has exclusive preferences, which should, 
if any, disturb minority shareholders. 
Summary 
In this chapter, main emphasis is placed on different approaches to measure private benefits 
of control and to corresponding analyses which use these approaches. First approach, initially 
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suggested by (Holderness, Barclay, 1989) is used in a great number of papers. Those papers, 
however, are mostly aimed at determining the absolute value of private benefits of control and 
their determinants rather than at their potential impact on corporate governance, firm performance 
or firm value, e.g. (Dyck, Zingales, 2004),  (Albuquerque, Schroth, 2009), (Poulsen, 2011), (Barak, 
Lauterbach, 2011), (Intrisano, 2012), (Weifeng, 2008) and others. While another approach, based 
on proxying private benefits of control through the voting premia, is mostly used by the researches 
to find a relationship between private benefits of control and other subsequent changes in 
company’s characteristics, e.g. (Erhardt, Nowak, 2003), (Gompers, Ishii, Metrick, 2008), (Holmen, 
2011), (Muravyev, Berezinets, Ilina, 2014).  
In the study of the relationship between private benefits of control and the value of the firm, 
some papers, aimed at finding a link between PBC and the value of the company were identified. 
The first group of papers confirms that the presence of two types of shares indicates the intention 
of the owners of the company to retain private benefits of control in their hands, which causes 
corresponding feedback from investors. The second group of papers indicates that the 
concentration of the company in hands of one or two owners will lead to the subsequent 
expropriation of minority shareholders, also adversely affecting the value of the company. The 
third group of studies notes the existence of private benefits of control in emerging markets, and 
confirms the impact of government regulation on the magnitude of private benefits of control and 
the value of the company. 
Given the specifics of each approach used for measuring private benefit of control, these 
differences are to be accounted in accordance with the research goal. As it was obtained from the 
comprehensive literature review, researches are tend to use voting premia as a measure of private 
benefits of control, while analyzing their effect on a company. In this paper, voting premium will 
also be used as a measure of private benefits of control due to two reasons. First, the purpose of the 
paper is to study the relationship between PBC and the firm value, whereas in Russia and many 
other countries two classes of shares can be freely traded on the market. Second, considering the 
possibility of applying each of the methods on the Russian market, it is important to note that by 
analyzing the trading history of 99 Russian companies over the period between 1997 and 2005, 
(Muravyev, 2007) confirmed the use of the voting premium approach with the corresponding 
control contest model. In this paper, following the analyzed literature, voting premium approach 
will be used to find the relationship between private benefits of control and firm value. 
41 
 
Given the fact that voting premium considers the companies with dual-class structures, of 
special interest will be the analysis of companies, where occurrence of preferred shares was caused 
by different factors. In Russia, dual class share structure was introduced in 1992 during the 
privatization process as a way for the government to protect their rights to manage corporations. 
This program was performed by using three different methods. One of them implied creating a 
public enterprise with an obligation to devote 25 percent of the charter capital to preferred shares, 
which were further distributed among employees and retirees (Muravyev, 2007). In distinction 
from Russia, in developed countries such as Germany, introduction of preferred shares reflected 
the desire of owners to preserve their private benefits of control at the expense of the new minority 
shareholders (Ehrhardt, Nowak, 2001).  In this study, we, therefore, will be interested how the 
relationship between firm value and private benefits of control are differ in Russia, where the dual 
class structure was established as a government initiative during the privatization and in Germany, 
where the companies established dual class structure to attract new capital while preserving their 
private benefits of control by the family owners. 
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CHAPTER 3. EMPIRICAL STUDY 
3.1 Hypotheses and methodology 
The main purpose of this research is to determine relationships between private benefits of 
control and firm value for Russian and German markets. Based on the conducted literature review, 
the following hypotheses were stated: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between private benefits of control and firm value 
Relationship is expected to be negative both for Russian and German companies throughout 
the whole period.  
Of the minor, but not the least concern is the question of how the relationship between 
private benefits of control and firm value, if any, differs in Russia and Germany. To stress that, the 
hypothesis stated below is tested: 
H2: Private benefits of control have different return to firm value in Russia and Germany 
Current research aimed at determining the relationship between firm value and private 
benefits of control is based on the following regression model: 
 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, i=1,2,…, N; t=2005,…,2011,  
(3.1) 
where 
• VP – measure of private benefits of control 
• X – vector of variables, reflecting corporate governance 
• Y – vector of variables, reflecting firm’s financials 
• β1, β2, β3 – vectors of unknown coefficients 
• uit – random variable 
As it was confirmed in the first chapter, Tobin’s Q is used as a proxy for the firm value. The 
ratio is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity and book value of debt divided by the 
book value of firm’s assets (Chund, Pruitt, 1994). 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖𝑗 =  
𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
 (3.2) 
The independent variable is the voting premium, which represents private benefits of control 
and calculated as the difference between the price of common and preference shares and divided by 
the preference share price. To calculate the average prices, mean values of bid and ask over the 
period between May and August is used (Muravyev, Berezinets, Iliina, 2014). 
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𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑗 =  
𝑃𝐶𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑡
 (3.3) 
All the control variables comprising the basic model are grouped in two categories. In the 
first group, all the factors related to the corporate governance and of the concern of this thesis are 
considered, while the second reflects firm’s financials, which affect the firm value and should be 
controlled.  
Following variables were included in the corporate governance group: board size (BD), 
independent directors (ID), share of the first largest shareholder (OWNER1), difference between the 
share of the first and the second largest shareholders (DOWNER). Variable, which characterizes 
board size is represented by the actual number of directors in a company. Number of independent 
directors is calculated as the ratio of independent directors to the board size. Variable, reflecting the 
stake of the largest shareholder is the share of the first largest shareholder. Difference between 
stakes of the first and the second largest shareholders is the stake of the largest shareholder less the 
stake of the second largest shareholder. 
Financial variables are included in the regression within the baseline model constructed with 
respect to reviewed literature: leverage (LEV), size (SZ), research and development expenses (RD) 
and return on equity (ROE). 
Indebtness may influence firm value both positively and negatively (Konijn, Kraussl, Lucas, 
2009). From the one hand, high debt could be a disciplinary factor, reducing agency costs. On the 
other hand, excessive debt induces larger bankruptcy costs and prevents managers from accepting 
profitable investments (Myers, 1977). Leverage is calculated as debt/book value of assets (Vintila, 
Gherghina, 2014; Dah, 2016) 
 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑡
  (3.4) 
(Short, Keasey, 1999) note that size may have positive influence on firm performance, as 
soon as larger companies have easier access to funds. Size is represented by the natural logarithm of 
total assets (Wald, 1999; Pandey, 2004; Bates, Kahle, Stulz, 2009).  
 𝑆𝑍𝑖𝑗 =  ln (𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡) 
(3.5) 
Investments in R&D represent future growth opportunities (Jaffe, 1986) and proxied by the 
R&D expenditures to total assets ratio (Carosi, 2015). 
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𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 =
𝑅&𝐷 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
  (3.6) 
Additionally, model will be controlled for return on assets measured by dividing net income 
by the book value of assets (Abdullah, Shah, Khan, 2012; Kuzey, Uyar, 2016) 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
 (3.7) 
The table below represents expected signs for the coefficients of the control variables in 
accordance with the reviewed literature. 
Table 3.1 Expected sign of regression coefficients for control variables 
Independent 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Empirical Support 
BD - (Ilina, Berezinets, Cherkasskaya, 2013), (Adams, Akiyol, Verwijmeren, 2015) 
ID + (Adams, Kirchmaier, 2015), (Dah, 2016) 
OWNER1 +  (Dacunto, 2014) 
DOWNER + (Konijn, Kraussl, Lucas, 2009) 
LEV - (Xiao, 2009), (Vintila, Gherghina, 2014), (Kuzey, Uyar, 2016) 
SZ + (Bates, Kahle, Stulz, 2009), (Abdullah, Shah, Khan, 2012) 
RD + (Gleason, Klock, 2006), (Ahharwal, Zhao, 2007) 
ROA + (Krausel, Lucas, 2010), (Kim, Park, Suh, 2017) 
3.2 Sample selection 
As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the relationship between private benefits of 
control and firm value is analyzed both for Russian and German markets. In accordance with the 
research goal, while constructing the sample, the main emphasis is placed on the data, necessary for 
calculating PBC. For the purpose of this research, the voting premium approach to measure private 
benefits of control is chosen, which requires a company to have traded common and preference 
shares. The main rationale of the voting premium approach and related control contest model 
implies that the difference between common shares (voting) and preference (non-voting) could be a 
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feasible proxy for PBC. The following condition is viable for the German and Russian markets, 
forasmuch as the preference shares in both countries confines investors in the same manner with 
only minor differences as it is discussed below. 
In Germany the status of preferred shares is specified in The German Stock Corporation Act 
(AktG). First, preference shares offer their owners the dividend premium and the guaranteed 
minimum of dividends paid. Second, preferred shareholders receive dividends before ordinary 
shareholders. Third owners of non-voting shares have exceptional rights if company is liquidated. 
Fourth, dividends cumulate over the years if company unable to pay them out. This, finally, results 
in a substantial advantage for the preferred stocks shareholders. Fifth, in special cases, preferred 
shares could be converted into common.  
In Russia the legal status of preference shares is defined in the standard corporate charter. 
First, as it is in Germany, Russian preferred shareholders have the minimum level of 10% of 
company’s annual net profit as the dividends guaranteed. Second, preferred shareholders receive 
dividends before common stockholders. Third, holders of preference shares are also guaranteed to 
receive superior rights in the case of company liquidation. Fourth, non-voting shares might be 
enfranchised, temporary granting its owner with the voting right, if dividends were not fully paid. 
Fifth, in special cases, as in Germany, preferred shares could be converted in common.  
After the comparability of preference shares in Russia and German was assessed, sample 
construction process was conducted. The sample of companies was collected by using the 
Thompson Reuters Data and which satisfy the following criteria: 
• Company has dual class stock structure 
• Company was traded on RTS Stock Exchange and Deutsche Boerse Stock Exchange 
between 2005 and 2011 
• Company does not relate to the financial sector 
Dual class structure is an obligatory requirement for studying the voting premium. Chosen 
time period reflects the desire to obtain result which will reflect the relationship over the whole 
period, including pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisos. And as it is done in financial studies, financial 
sector was not included in both sample. Eventually, two samples of 105 and 36 companies for the 
Russian and German markets correspondingly is constructed. The main sources of information are 
presented on the table 2 and are discussed below.  
Thompson Reuters Datastream is used to obtain both the information about the companies, 
which shares are publicly traded and the prices about the shares of those companies. Missing data is 
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manually collected from the websites of RTS Stock Exchange and Deutsche Boerse Stock 
Exchange. 
Accounting information about both Russian and German companies is sufficiently obtained 
through the sources of Thompson Reuters Datastream.  
Information about the supervisory board size and the ownership concentration in Russian 
companies is extracted from the SKRIN and SPARK databases and complemented by the hand-
picked data from annual reports. Information related to the corporate governance in Germany is 
obtained from annual and quarterly reports.  
Table 3.2 Data sources of data used 
№ Data Sources of information 
1 Share prices Thomson Reuters Datastream / 
Stock Exchage Websites 
2 Accounting data Thomson Reuters Datastream / 
Annual reports 
3 Board size (Russia) SKRIN / SPARK 
4 Independent Directors (Russia) SKRIN / SPARK / Annual 
reports 
5 Ownership (Russia) SKRIN / SPARK 
6 Board size (Germany) Annual reports 
7 Independent Directors (Germany) Annual reports 
8 Ownership (Germany) Annual reports 
The final samples consist of 119 and 36 companies for Russian and German markets 
correspondingly. Russian sample is represented by 5 industries, in accordance with the SIC 
classification: electric power (45%), manufacturing (12%), mining (12%), telecommunications 
(25%), transportation (6%). German sample is comprised of 9 industries: manufacturing (8%), 
construction (8%), services (4%), retail (12%), public administration (4%), transportation (3%), 
communications (2%), electric (3%), wholesale trade (8%). Substantially lower number of 
observations in German companies is explained by the specifics of the German markets, where in 
the most of the companies with the dual class stock structure, the whole stake of common stocks is 
held by families. Moreover, as of June 2002, most of the companies had to reevaluate advantages of 
dual class structure as soon as DAX index introduced new rule, implying that either ordinary or 
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preferred stock of the company might be included in the index. On Russian market, as opposed to 
German, both preferred and common stocks are freely traded on the stock exchange.  
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
In this section, descriptive statistics of variables is presented and further discussed. The 
section is divided into two subsections. Russian market is discussed in the first section, German in 
the second. In the second section, besides the main discussion about the German market, comparison 
of two markets is provided.  
Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics of Russian sample 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Tobin’s Q 0.847 0.678 0.030 5.422 
VP 0.865 1.104 0.002 5.873 
BD 9.070 2.075 5 15 
ID 0.114 0.127 1 0.714 
OWNER1 0.535 0.187 0.0634 1 
DOWNER 0.387 0.232 0.001 0.9911 
LEV 0.233 0.217 0.001 1.259 
SZ 16.320 2.159 11.745 23.105 
RD 0.021 0.013 0.000 0.118 
ROA 0.792 0.092 0.004 0.689 
Based on the results presented on the table above, the average Tobin’s Q ratio is equal to 
0.85, which means that, on average, market underprices company’s assets. This observation is 
confirmed by the other study, in which the authors obtained very similar result of 0.82 (Ilina, 
Berezinets, Cherkasskaya, 2013). Among the companies with the lowest value were 
“Chelyabenergo”, “Izhstal”, “Saratosvkiy NPZ”, “Orenburgneft”, “Rostovenergo”, 
“Tverenenergosbyt”, while the highest value of Tobin’s Q is observed for “SN-MNG”, 
“Marienergosbyt”, “Baltika”, “Rostelekom”, “Samaraenergo”, “Saratovenergo”, 
“Smolenskenergosbyt”, “TRK”. Dynamics of Tobin’s Q changes is demonstrated on the figure 4, 
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and shows that on average Tobin’s Q ratio was higher for the Russian market over 2005 to 2007 than 
during the crisis period between 2008 and 2009. The market experienced further increase in 2009 
and here recovery of the economy could be hypothesized.  
Figure 3.1 Dynamics of average Tobin’s Q changes over 2005-2011, Russian market  
 
The voting premium in Russian companies averages 86%. This is a quite high number, 
comparing this result with other similar studies of emerging markets. For example, in Brazil and 
South Africa, (Benos, Weisbach, 2004) report average voting premium to be 25.3% and 7.6% 
respectively. Russian market, however, is characterized by the significant problems in corporate 
governance (Goetzman, Spiegel, Ukhov 2003) and therefore might have higher average VP. 
Obtained number is lower than those obtained by the other researches, though.  (Muravyev, 
Berezinets, Iliina, 2014) report that the average voting premium in Russia over the time span from 
1998 to 2009 was 113%. As soon as the observation period of the current study covers pre- and post- 
crisis periods, it is essential to track how the financial crisis of 2008 affected the voting premium in 
Russia. The graph below represents the dynamics based on the collected data. 
0.56
1.23 1.25
0.89
0.56
0.73 0.75
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Tobin's Q, Russia
49 
 
Figure 3.2 Dynamics of average voting premium changes over 2005-2011, Russian market 
 
The highest value of private benefits of control was in 2005 with further double decrease in 
2007 from 128% to 63%. During the crisis, another increase up to 106% and 107% is observable. In 
2010 and 2011 voting premium returns back to its inferior level of 61%. There are, certainly, many 
factors affecting the size of private benefits of control. We may hypothesize that the control contest 
lowers during the crisis periods, leading to the lower size of PBC.  
Russian companies on average have 9 members in supervisory board. This result corresponds 
to the research of (Muravyev, 2017), who based on a sample of Russian companies between 1998 
and 2014 reports the average board size of 9 members. (Iwasaki, 2008), however, obtained the mean 
of 6.79, while analyzing the board composition of Russian companies.  
Number of independent directors in Russian companies averages 12%. Among other 
researches, investigating corporate governance, (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2012) should be 
emphasized. In accordance with this research, average percentage of independent directors in Russia 
is 36%.  
Estimated percentage of the largest owner’s share is 53%. This number reflects the fact that 
the Russian companies are tend to be controlled by the single shareholder. (Berezinets, Iliina, 
Alekseeva) while observing the period of 2003-2009 find almost similar result of 51%. The 
difference between the two largest owners is equal to 38%, which implies that usually the control 
contest among shareholders is not intense. 
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As it can be inferred from the table, average leverage of Russian companies is equal to 0.23, 
with the minimum value of almost 0 and the maximum of 1.26. Leverage is of a special interest in 
this study, since the relationship between leverage and Tobin’s Q ratio has been studied a lot and 
firm value proxy should be controlled for the indebtedness. 
Size of the company, represented by the logarithm of total assets cannot be explained in 
economical terms. 
In the next section variables related to the German market are presented. The table below 
demonstrates descriptive statistics of the German sample.  
Table 3.4 Descriptive statistics of German sample 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Tobin’s Q 1.028 0.560 0.062 3.469 
VP 0.389 0.416 0.000 2.805 
BD 13.950 6.906 3 21 
ID 0.588 0.143 0.25 0.882 
OWNER1 0.415 0.227 0.067 0.8802 
DOWNER 0.335 0.254 0.004 0.8802 
LEV 0.276 0.153 0.000 0.617 
SZ 15.262 2.186 11.626 19.326 
RD 0.030 0.022 0.000 0.094 
ROA 0.052 0.041 0.000 0.208 
The constructed sample of German companies has an average value of Tobin’s Q ratio equal 
to 1.02. This implies that on average investors assign to companies prices higher than the book 
values in distinction from the Russian market. (Ghosh, 2007) reports Tobin’s Q to be 1.11 in 2005 
for the German market which corresponds to the obtained value, while (Dittman, Ulbricht, 2004),   
obtain the value of 1.5. German companies with the lowest ratio are “Biotest”, “Man”, “Metro”, 
“RWE”, “Sartorius”, “Axa Konzern”, “Fresenius”, “Rheinmetall”. The group of companies which is 
priced by the investors at a highest price contains the following companies: “Henkel”, “Fulchs”, 
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“HUGO BOSS”, “Fresenius Medical Care”, “RhoenKlinikum”. Graph shown below presents the 
dynamics of the average Tobin’s Q ratio over the period between 2005 and 2011 in Germany.  
Figure 3.3 Dynamics of average Tobin’s Q changes over 2005-2011, German market 
 
As it is on the Russian market, investors price companies’ assets higher until 2007,  with the 
further decrease in 2008 and 2009, as a matter of the financial crisis. During the period between 
2009 and 2011 average Tobin’s Q ratio recovered back to its pre-crisis value of 1.11.  
Size of private benefits of control in Germany is relatively lower than in Russia. As it can be 
inferred from the figure 4, the voting premium experienced slight growth during the period  between 
2005 and 2008 from 30% to 40% and grew again up to 53% in 2009. Afterwards, the measure of 
private benefits of control returned back to the approximate value of 40%. Size of the measure of 
PBC in Germany averages in 38%, which is 126% lower than in Russia. In distinction from the 
current study, (Doidge, 2004), while estimating among other the voting premium in Germany got the 
value of 15.5%. (Guadalupe, Gonzalez, 2010), analyzing the timespan between 1990 and 2003 report 
the voting premium in Germany to be 19.3%. Such discrepancy in results could be explained by the 
fact that the German wave of shares unification in 2002 left only those companies, which owners are 
mostly concerned with preserving their private benefits.  
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Figure 3.4 Dynamics of average voting premium changes over 2005-2011, German market 
 
Average number of supervisory board members in Germany is 14, which is significantly 
higher than in Russia. Average number of independent directors is equal to 58%. In spite of the fact, 
that in Germany, in distinction from Russia, the Corporate Governance Code doesn’t state the lowest 
number of independent directors due to the specific of two-tier system, companies are still more 
concerned about keeping their supervisory board independent.  
Stake of the largest shareholder in German company averages 41.3%, which is consistent 
with the conclusion of (Gugler. Yutoglu, 2002) that the average share of the first largest shareholder 
in Germany is equal to approximately 45%. (Jens Koke, 1999) report the value of 57%, also 
analyzing the time span between 1990 and 2000. Interestingly, despite the fact that family-owned 
companies prevail in Germany, largest shareholders do not tend to concentrate the power in their 
hands. This interpretation, however, might be biased. As it is discussed above, large stake of 
companies with dual class structure do not trade their ordinary shares. It should be taken into 
account, that should the owner of the company desire to retain the absolute power over the company, 
she would not have started to trade ordinary shares. In this example, therefore, it could be said, that 
the sample consists of the companies, where the controlling shareholders are not concerned about 
keeping complete control over the company. The power of those shareholder is also substantially 
lower than in Russia, with an average difference between the stakes of the first and the second 
largest shareholders equal to 33.4%.  
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Average size of the German companies are proxied by the logarithm of total assets and equal 
to 15.3. The average size of sampled companies in Germany is moderately lower than in Russia. 
3.4 Regression Analysis 
In the following section, regression analysis results are presented and discussed. The aim of 
the conducted analysis was to determine the relationship between private benefits of control and firm 
value in Russian and German markets. The regression is controlled for the variables, previously 
mentioned in other researchers and comprising the baseline model. The analysis is handled in three 
steps. First, the sample consisting of Russian companies is analyzed. Second, the same procedure is 
done for the German sample. Third, special emphasis is placed on the comparison of two countries 
and the discussion of those differences. Each sample is analyzed with respect to all three models: 
Pooled OLS, Fixed effects, Random Effects. In the end of each subsection, the most adequate model 
is chosen based on Wald, Breusch and Pagan Lagranian, and Hausman tests.  
3.4.1 Russian sample 
First, pooled, fixed effects and random effects regression models were constructed. Results of 
those models are presented in Table 3.5. All the models are significant and could be interpreted. 
Voting premium, size of the first shareholder’s stake, difference between the first and largest 
shareholders’ stake and ROA are statistically significant. Obtained results are presented below. 
Table 3.5 Summary of regression analysis for the Russian sample 
Variable Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
VP -0.104  -0.126*  -0.173*** 
BS -0.014  -0.009  0.007 
ID 1.313**  0.873  0.803 
OWNER1 2.067*  2.122  2.197* 
DOWNER -1.744**  -1.857  -1.580* 
LEV 0.099  0.900  0.307 
SZ 0.009  -0.941***  -0.059 
RD -10.67  -27.863  -0.450 
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Table 3.5 Summary of regression analysis for the Russian sample (continued) 
Variable Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
ROA 2.318**  0.612  1.940** 
R2 0.086  0.0003  0.1192 
Prob > F 0.0408  0.0008  - 
 
The main finding of the conducted analysis reveals negative relationship between private 
benefits of control proxied by the voting premium and the firm value represented by Tobin’s Q ratio. 
According to the reported results, it is significant in all three models at 1% level. Expected sign is in 
line with the literature review and allows to accept the hypothesis about the negative relationship 
between private benefits of control and firm value in Russia. This result proves the opinion, that the 
presence of PBC negatively affects firm value. (Grossman, Hart, 1988) explained that isolation of 
the management from the market for corporate control is not in securityholders’ interest. Taking in 
consideration the fact that the average stake of the first largest shareholder is more than 51%, it 
could be concluded that in Russia, in companies with dual class stock structure, owners are tend to 
build up private benefits of control. Interestingly, Tobin’s Q equals 0.85 and consistent with the 
obtained result for the voting premium. It could be assumed that investors, while having a feeling 
that the management of the companies might expropriate them in favor of their own interest 
undervalue the company. 
Board size is insignificant and therefore results could not be interpreted. This result is 
common for other studies as well. For example (Weterings, Swagerman, 2010) report the 
insignificant relationship between the board size and Tobin’s Q ratio for the sample of Hong Kong, 
Malaysian and Singapore companies. Same conclusion is made by (Rodiguez-Fernandex, 2014) who 
scrutinized, among others, the relationship between board size and firm value proxied by Tobin’s Q. 
However, (Berezinets, Iliina, Cherkasskaya, 2013) find this relationship to be significant on the 
Russian market. The rationale behind the insignificance is the specifics of Russian corporate 
governance. Supervisory boards are lack of mechanisms which consistently track their performance. 
It could be inferred, that there is no significant relationship due to the fact, that the input of 
supervisory board members is not reflected in the market price of a company. Share of independent 
directors is insignificant and could not be interpreted. 
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Size of the largest shareholder stake is significantly positively relates to firm value at 10% 
level in pooled OLS and random effects models. Such result is consistent with the ideas of (Jensen, 
Meckling, 1976) and (Shliefer, Vyshny, 1986) who supported the monitoring role of shareholders. 
(Adams, Kirchmeier, 2015) argues that in U.S. market largest shareholder’s stake has a positive 
influence on firm size. However, (Dacunto, 2014) finds positive relationship between the ownership 
concentration and frim value among French, Italian and Spanish companies. Overall, to avoid 
biasness in conclusion, analysis should be further conducted by applying the sample consisted of 
both dual and one class stock structure companies,  
The difference between the stakes of the first and second largest shareholders is significant in 
pooled OLS and random effects model at 5% and 1% respectively. Unlike it was expected, the 
variable has a negative sign. Reported result correlates with the previously obtained positive 
relationship between the size of the first largest shareholder and firm value. Negative relationship 
might signal that rigid contest among two largest shareholders might decrease governance efficiency 
(Maury, Pajuste, 2002) or that coalition is being shaped by the largest shareholders to extract private 
benefits of control. 
Unexpectedly, significant negative relationship between the size of the company and firm 
value has been found in fixed effects regression at 1% level. There might be a set of rationales 
behind such result. First, larger companies are usually associated with the oldest and inflexible ones. 
Investors, might value smaller companies to have more space for growth in the future and therefore 
price them higher than they price mastodons of the market. Second, large size of a company provides 
managers with better opportunities of expropriating shareholders, while increasing agency costs 
(Xiao, 2009), (Berk, Demarzzo, 2014). Same result is reported by (Black, Jang, Kim, 2002) who 
studies the Korean market of 1990s.  
Return on assets shows significance at 5% level with the expected sign. ROA is a part of the 
baseline model and its relationship with the firm value is very intuitive. There is a large list of papers 
exploring this question, though. (Sudiyatno, 2012), (Pascareno, Siringoringo, 2014), (Asiri, Hamid, 
2014) and many others 
Leverage and research and development expenses are found to be insignificant and could not 
be interpreted. 
As soon as all of the performed models are significant additional tests were needed. Based on 
the consequent application of Wald, Breusch and Pagan Lagranian, and Hausman, random effects 
56 
 
model shows that the random effects model describes given empirical findings the most adequately 
for the Russian market. 
3.4.2 German sample 
Table 3.6 Summary of regression analysis for the German sample 
Variable Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
VP 0.321***  0.425***  0.321*** 
BS -0.01  -0.116  -0.01 
ID 0.835**  0.46  0.835** 
OWNER1 -1.557*  1.158  -1.557* 
DOWNER 1.5**  -0.089  1.5** 
LEV 0.76*  0.413  0.76* 
SZ 0.012  -0.038  0.012 
RD 7.09  4.3  7.09 
ROA 9.78***  8.82***  9.78*** 
R2 0.82  0.73  0.85 
Prob > F 0.000  0.000  - 
Note: the symbols *, ** and *** sign the variables significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Voting premium shows significant positive relationship with firm value in Germany at 1% 
level in pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects regression models. This is a counterintuitive 
result, which shows that private benefits of control positively relate to German companies’ value. 
The reasoning of the obtained result could be provided in two ways. First explanation considers the 
possibility that in Germany investors associate higher private benefits of control with the higher 
commitment of owners to the company. There is a such possibility, taking into account the fact, that 
dual class stock structure is mostly conducted within family-owned companies, which ensures 
investors that the presence of PBC is offset by the deeper engagement of owners in the business 
processes. Second explanation accepts the chance that the regression model has omitted variables, 
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which has not been considered. Nevertheless, the main hypothesis of the study is rejected for the 
German market. 
Within the given sample of German companies with two classes of shares there is an absence 
of significant relationship between board size and firm value. This result is not consistent with 
papers of for example (Yermack, 1996), who finds that the board size positively relates to frim value 
in U.S. market. However, more recent research of (Frick, Bermig, 2009) explores this relationship to 
be insignificant for the list of 294 German companies, which corresponds to the regression analysis 
results.  
Relationship between the share of independent directors is positive and significant which is 
consistent with the expected sign. It might be concluded that in Germany presence of independent 
directors implies better governance due to the impartiality of decisions made by such supervisory 
board.  
Significant relationship between the largest shareholder’s stake and firm value is found to be 
significant and negative at 10% level in pooled OLS and fixed effects regression models. Investors 
therefore tend to undervalue companies more with the growth of the largest shareholder’s stake. 
Recent study made by (Brendel, Schwetzler, Strenger, 2016) explores this relationship over the 
period 2000-2003 and finds that the size of the largest shareholder positively relates to the firm 
value.  
Relative power of the largest shareholder expressed by the average difference between stakes 
of the first and second largest shareholders of German companies has negative relationship with firm 
value in pooled OLS and random effects regression models at 10% level. Given result implies, that 
the contest between largest shareholders associated with the higher valuation of the companies.  
Leverage used as a control variable in the basic model has the positive relationship with the 
firm value, which is consistent with the number of studies. (Barontini, Caprio, 2005) stress 
relationship between leverage and firm value for family-owned German companies and find it to be 
significant and negative.  
Size of a company represented by the natural logarithm of total assets do not show any 
significant relationship with firm value and could not be interpreted, as well as the research and 
development expenditures. Insignificance of size of a company is also presented in papers of 
(Vintial, Gherhina, 2014), in which the Bucharest market is analyzed. Insignificance of these 
variables is clearly explained by the fact that in Germany investors value companies based on their 
operational performance than on the actual size of the company or their investments in research & 
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development. While arguing about insignificance of R&D expenses on firm values, one should 
consider that the companies presented in the sample are mostly stable and large companies. Unlike 
high-tech companies, sampled firms are not entirely dependent on new developments.  
As a part of the basic model, ROA ratio is significant and positive at 1% level, which is not 
surprising and obtained by most of the authors, as it is presented in the discussion of the results for 
the Russian market.  
3.4.3 Comparison of Russian and German samples 
While comparing Russian and German samples in regard of the relationship between private 
benefits of control and firm value, the assumption about the different return of PBC to firm value 
should be first stressed. To test this hypothesis interaction term (Countrycrossvar) is introduced. To 
calculate it, first, binary variable (Country) is presented, which takes the value of 1 if corresponding 
country is Russia and 0 if not. Further, dummy variable, representing the country is multiplied by the 
voting premium, proxying private benefits of control.  
 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 =  𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡×𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑡  (3.8) 
With the inclusion of the new variable, the regression is run for the merged sample consisting 
of Russian and German samples. On table 3.7 obtained results are presented.  
Table 3.7 Summary of regression analysis for the merged sample 
Variable Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
VP 0.538***  0.367**  0.389*** 
BS -0.010  -0.0161  -0.007 
ID 1.165***  0.408  0.624 
OWNER1 1.023  3.044***  1.867** 
DOWNER -0.816  -2.405***  -1.318** 
LEV -0.060  0.329  0.122 
SZ -0.264  -0.545***  -0.056 
RD -1.495  2.443  3.807 
ROA 3.352***  1.729**  2.438*** 
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Table 3.7 Summary of regression analysis for the merged sample (continued) 
Variable Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
CountryVariable 0.387  -  0.308 
Countrycrossvar -0.644***  -0.537***  -0.573*** 
R2 0.309  0.078  0.248 
Prob > F 0.000  0.000  - 
Note: the symbols *, ** and *** sign the variables significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Additionally, both variables (CountryVariable) and (Countrycrossvar) were tested on 
significance. Hypotheses stating that coefficients equal to zero were rejected. In accordance with the 
given results it could be concluded that private benefits of control have stronger negative return to 
firm value in Russia than in Germany. Specifically, for every extra unit of voting premium 
representing private benefits of control, firm value proxied by Tobin’s Q in Russia is decreasing by 
0.573 over and above the firm value in Germany in accordance with the random effects regression. 
Russian investors tend to react more sensitively than in Germany on the presence of private benefits 
of control. Weak corporate governance mechanisms inherent to Russian market cannot provide 
sufficient protection of minority shareholders. They therefore tend to undervalue companies which 
provide control shareholders with an opportunity to extract exclusive benefits.  
As a next step, results of individually analyzed samples are compared. Within the comparison 
of the differences between Russian and German markets, variances in the relationship between firm 
value and other variables is interpreted. Results are shown on the table below. 
Table 3.8 Comparison of results of regression modelling for Russian and German companies 
Variable  Russia  Germany 
VP  Negative***  Positive*** 
BS  -  - 
ID  -  Positive** 
OWNER1  Positive*  Negative** 
DOWNER  Negative*  Positive** 
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Table 3.8 Comparison of results of regression modelling for Russian and German companies 
(continued) 
Variable  Russia  Germany 
LEV  -  Positive* 
SZ  -  - 
RD  -  - 
ROA  Positive**  Positive*** 
Note: the symbols *, ** and *** sign the variables significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Main differences in results for the Russian and German market concerns the main question of 
the study, whether there is a relationship between private benefits of control proxied by the voting 
premium and firm value represented by Tobin’s Q. Interestingly, the sign is different for Russia and 
Germany, which implies that all else being equal investors in Russia consider the presence of PBC as 
a signal about expropriation, while in Germany, it is perceived as a positive sign. One may 
hypothesize that in Germany families who issue preferred shares do so to retain control over the 
company that has been developing by their ancestors for ages, but not to enrich themselves to the 
detriment of minorities.  Russian market, oppositely is not associated with the commitment of major 
shareholders to their firms, since they received control during the privatization program in 1990s and 
may be mainly interested in personal enrichment.  
Board size hasn’t relationship with firm value in Russian as well as in Germany, which is 
consistent with the papers aforementioned in this study.  
Essential to mention that the share of independent directors in supervisory board is 
insignificant in Russia, yet has positive relationship with firm value in Germany. It may be 
concluded from this result that in Germany independent directors in fact positively influence 
decision making process, by offering their expertise and strategic advices. Russian market strives for 
increasing the number of independent directors, but the main question is whether these directors are 
really independent.  
Size of the largest shareholder’s stake and her power have different relationship with firm 
value in Russia in Germany, as well as the private benefits of control does. In Russia, within 
analyzed sample, the larger the stake of the major shareholder, the larger firm value, whilst lower 
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power of this shareholder leads to higher valuation. Opposite is true for Germany. This result again 
might be explained by the difference in perception in Russia and Germany. Russian investors price 
the companies where the largest shareholder has more power higher. It might be assumed that the 
lower the discrepancy between the first and the second shareholders’ stake, the higher probability of 
the coalition formation. In Germany, from the other hand, firms where the largest shareholders have 
less stake and power are valued higher.  
Other control variables are not of the primary interest and do not have controversial or 
interesting results. Return of assets ratio positively relates to firm value in both countries. Size of the 
company expressed by the natural logarithm of total assets is insignificant in relation to firm value, 
as well as research and development expenditures. Leverage is not significant for Russia and 
significant and positive for the German sample.  
Summary 
In this chapter, empirical evidence for the stated goal and questions is provided. Chapter 
covered five main points necessary for conducting the research: hypothesis statement, methodology 
and sample depiction, descriptive statistics and finally regression analysis. 
First, based on the deep and thorough literature review, the hypotheses are stated. In 
accordance with the literature, we hypothesized that negative relationship between private benefits of 
control and firm value should take place and that return of private benefits of control to firm value is 
different in Russia and Germany. Second, methodology of the analysis is provided. Methodology 
description included the model depiction and detailed explanation of variables used in the model and 
the specification of calculation approaches of the chosen variables. Third, sample selection and data 
gathering process were specified in the next section. Fourth, in-depth analysis of constructed samples 
is made in the section with descriptive statistics. Finally, the regression analysis is conducted in the 
last section.  
Main findings of this chapter concern the relationship between private benefits of control and 
firm value in Russia and Germany. Controversially, in Russia PBC positively relate to firm value, 
while the opposite true in Germany. Moreover, the analysis revealed that private benefits of control 
have different return to firm value in Russian and Germany. Regression analysis introduced new 
findings regarding both markets, apart from the main research question. For example, opposite signs 
in two markets for the relationship between the stake size of the largest shareholder and firm value is 
obtained. Same result is reported for the relative power of the largest shareholder, expressed by the 
difference between the stake sizes of the first and second largest shareholders.  
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CONCLUSION 
 The main research goal of this paper was to determine the relationship between private 
benefits of control and firm value as well as to define the direction of this relation. All the initially 
stated objectives were consecutively reached.  
In the first chapter various firm valuation approaches were analyzed and discussed. Further, 
critical review of the most recent and actual research paper, exploring the topic of firm valuation 
determinants is provided. Eventually, the first chapter resulted in the final choice of the firm proxy 
for the purpose of this research. 
The second chapter was fully devoted to the problem of private benefits of control. In this 
chapter a large set of literature, where PBC is discussed was investigated. In the first part of the 
second chapter the emphasis was put on different approaches to measure private benefits of control. 
In the second part, a number of papers exploring the relationship between private benefits of control 
and firm value were discussed.  
In the third chapter, empirical study of the relationship between PBC and firm value was 
conducted by means of the regression analysis. The analysis resulted in several intriguing findings 
regarding the relationship between private benefits of control and firm value. 
First of all, the hypothesis about the negative relationship between private benefits of control 
and firm value was accepted for the Russian market. Meanwhile, in Germany positive relationship 
between PBC and firm value occurred and the main hypothesis was rejected. Based on these results, 
it was assumed that the main rationale behind such result is the difference in perception of dual class 
structure companies in Russia and Germany. While in Russia preferred stocks were introduced 
artificially by the government, in Germany dual class structure is usually chosen by the old family-
owned companies. German investors therefore tend to rely on companies with non-voting shares 
more than Russian. Furthermore, analysis revealed different return to firm value in Russia and 
Germany, which proves the conclusion that investors react on private benefits of control differently 
in Russia and Germany. 
Besides the main research goal, several other findings regarding the relationship between the 
corporate governance and firm value were made. Specifically, regression result showed that, share of 
independent directors in supervisory board does not relate to firm value in Russia, whilst has positive 
relationship in Germany. Moreover, in accordance with the conducted analysis, higher share of the 
largest shareholder positively associated with firm value in Russia and negatively in Germany. 
Furthermore, the power of the first largest shareholder, measured by the difference between stake 
63 
 
sizes of the first and second largest shareholders negatively related to firm value in Russia and 
positively in Germany.  
These controversial results were explained by the substantial differences in corporate 
governance models development background of two countries. In Germany market has been 
developing for more than a century, while in Russia barely two decades passed since the market 
economy emerged.  
Based on the findings, the set of managerial implications for investors is prepared. The fact 
that in Russia private benefits of control not only higher than in Germany, but also negatively relate 
to firm value should make investors more cautious before investing. Undoubtedly, investors do their 
choice regarding the country to invest based on the assessment of return and risks associated with the 
market. Nevertheless, additional consideration of PBC and their relation to firm value will provide 
an investor with the valuable information regarding the quality of corporate governance in a certain 
country. As it was concluded, since private benefits of control have positive relationship with firm 
value in Germany and negative in Russia, one may conclude that she should invest in German 
companies with the highest size of PBC and avoid investments in Russia.  In fact, an investor should 
use it as another tool to assess the quality of her future investments and assess PBC in relation to risk 
and return. It is worth noting that the problem of private benefits of control mainly matters for the 
long-term investors, who are of a risk of being consistently expropriated. 
The master thesis contributes to existing theory by investigating the relationship between 
private benefits of control and firm value in the context of the comparison of emerging and 
developed markets. Current research provides a room for future research regarding the relationship 
between private benefits of control, risk and return of companies, which may assess how private 
benefits of control will influence short-term investors.  
While discussing the contribution of the current paper, some limitations have to be 
considered. First of all, private benefits of control may occur not only in companies with two classes 
of shares, therefore should another way, applicable for all types of companies, exist it would have 
been used. Second, the presence of dual class structure implies the presence of private benefits of 
control, as soon as non-voting shares are issued during the privatization process to retain control 
over the company. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Summary of multiples 
№ 
Price Multiples Enterprise Multiples 
1 Price-to-earnings EV/EBITDA 
2 Price-to-sales EV/EBIT 
3 Price-to-book EV/Sales 
4 Price-to-cash flow  
5 Price-to-dividends  
6 Tobin’s Q  
7 Market-to-book  
 
Appendix 2. Private benefits of control taxonomy 
  
Type of private benefits 
  
Pecuniary (“Tunneling”) Non-pecuinary 
T
ra
n
sf
er
a
b
il
it
y
 H
ig
h
 
 
I. “Self-Dealing” 
- Excessive compensation 
- Diversion of resources 
- Asset transfers at arbitrary prices 
- Cheap loans and guarantees 
 
 
III. “Amenties” 
- Winning the world series 
- Influencing public opinion 
- Owning a luxury brand 
- Physical appointments 
L
o
w
 
 
II. “Dilution 
- Insider trading 
- Creeping acquisitions 
- Freeze-out and squeeze-out 
- Issuance of shares at dilutive 
prices 
 
IV. “Reputation” 
- Social prestige 
- Family tradition 
- Promotion relations 
- Personal relations 
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Appendix 3. Control variables with expected signs 
№ 
Control 
Variable 
Expected Sign Empirical Support 
1 Leverage - (Xiao, 2009), (Vintila, Gherghina, 2014), (Kuzey, Uyar, 2016) 
2 Size + (Bates, Kahle, Stulz, 2009), (Abdullah, Shah, Khan, 2012) 
3 R&D expenses + (Gleason, Klock, 2006), (Ahharwal, Zhao, 2007) 
4 Return on 
Assets 
+ 
(Krausel, Lucas, 2010), (Kim, Park, Suh, 2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
